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The Substantially Impaired Sex:
Uncovering the Gendered Nature of
Disability Discrimination
Jennifer Bennett Shinall

†

INTRODUCTION
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits labor market discrimination against individuals who have
an “impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities,” who are “regarded as” having a substantial impair1
ment, or who have “a record of” a substantial impairment. A
substantial impairment has always been the touchstone of
what it means to be disabled for the purposes of federal discrimination law. Never has federal law attempted to distinguish between different types of substantial impairments, or
between degrees of substantial impairments, or between differ2
ent subgroups of substantially impaired individuals. An indi† Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue
South, Nashville, TN 37203. jennifer.shinall@vanderbilt.edu. (615) 343-9622.
The author wishes to thank Joni Hersch, Kathryn Anderson, James Blumstein, Nancy King, Alan Wiseman, participants in the 2015 Colloquium on
Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law, participants in the 2015 Southern
Economic Association Annual Meeting, and participants in the 2015 Vanderbilt Summer Lunch Series for their helpful feedback throughout the course of
this project. Copyright © 2017 by Jennifer Bennet Shinall.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012). For simplicity, I will refer only to the ADA,
which prohibits discrimination by private-sector employers against qualified
disabled workers, throughout this Article. Note, however, that the arguments
presented here would apply to other laws that prohibit discrimination against
disabled workers, including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as well as statelevel disability laws. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797(b) (2012) (covering public-sector
workplaces).
2. In fact, Congress’s intention when passing the ADA was to find a
common-ground definition of disability that would encompass all disabled individuals, despite the diversity of their disabling conditions. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE
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vidual who qualifies for coverage may be on a cane or in a
wheelchair, hard of hearing or completely deaf, African American or white, male or female. As long as the impairment meets
the substantial threshold, it is enough to afford the individual
coverage under the ADA, and coverage does not vary with se3
verity of the underlying condition. Nor does the ADA’s coverage vary if the substantially impaired individual is a member of
another protected class. A substantially impaired white male is
entitled to exactly the same remedies under the ADA as a sub4
stantially impaired African-American female.
Of course, disabled individuals who are members of other
protected classes may have access to additional employment
discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits race, color, national origin, religion,
5
and sex discrimination in employment. Yet such individuals
only have access if they have proof of discrimination that specifically relates to their Title VII protected status. For example,
a disabled female worker who feels she has been discriminated
against by her employer due to her disadvantaged status does
not necessarily have a successful claim under either Title VII or
the ADA. The worker can bring a successful ADA claim only if
she has proof specific to employer discrimination on the basis of
disability; she can bring a successful Title VII claim only if she
has proof specific to employer discrimination on the basis of
6
sex. If she lacks sufficient evidence for one claim—or more
worrisome, if her evidence of sex and disability discrimination

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 80 (2d ed. 2010), http://www.ncd.gov/
publications/2010/equality_of_Opportunity_The_Making_of_the_Americans_
with_Disabilities_Act (“The challenge, therefore, was to find a definition that
was at once inclusive enough to cover diverse disabilities, but not so universal
that anyone could claim protection by the ADA.”).
3. See id. at xviii (“The disability community’s abiding commitment to
act as one unified voice helped keep the ADA a strong act and prevented the
exclusion of specific subgroups of disabilities.”).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (noting Congress’s intent to provide a
“consistent” remedy for all disabled individuals).
5. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting employers from “fail[ing] or
refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
6. Cf. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So
Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 563 (2001) (describing courts’ reluctance to
draw an inference of discrimination from “ambiguous or contested evidence”
and circumstantial evidence more generally).
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is inextricably intertwined —she may only have a remedy under one of the two statutes, or she may completely lack a remedy.
Imagine the female worker is in a wheelchair and regularly
8
referred to by her employer as a “crippled witch,” or imagine
instead that the female worker has dyslexia and is regularly re9
ferred to by her employer as “a dumb slut.” In both cases, the
employer’s name-calling seems inappropriate for the workplace
and indicative of animus based on the worker’s disadvantaged
status. But it is not clear from the name-calling whether the
employer’s animus is derived from the worker’s status as a
woman, her status as a disabled person, or both. But if the female worker wants a remedy under Title VII and the ADA, she
will have to prove both—and it is not clear that she can from
these statements alone.
The dilemma faced by the disabled, female worker described above is an intersectionality problem. Intersectionality
problems may arise whenever an individual possesses multiple
10
traditionally disadvantaged identities or minority statuses.
Intersectionality implies that employment discrimination is
compounded or exacerbated in the presence of multiple protected statuses; in other words, the whole discrimination experienced by a multiple-protected-status individual is more than
11
the sum of its parts. To the extent that intersectionality ex-

7. Cf. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (demonstrating one federal court’s struggle to differentiate between age discrimination and sex discrimination when the plaintiff ’s
primary evidence was that she had been called “useless old lady” by her supervisors).
8. This example is one used by the United Nations in its disability equality training manual on defeating harmful stereotypes of disabled individuals.
See LIZ CARR ET AL., DISABILITY EQUALITY TRAINING: ACTION FOR CHANGE 73
(2012), http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/egms/2015/Kenji_Kuno_
Change.pdf (citing the image of a “crippled witch” as one of the ways in which
the “word disabled becomes synonymous for impotence, hopelessness and social inadequacy”).
9. This example is one used as an illustrative example of discrimination
by the Labor Law Center on its Human Resources Blog. See Insults in the
Workplace, LABOR LAW CTR.: HUMAN RES. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2011, 11:21 AM),
http://www.humanresourceblog.com/2011/10/29/insults-in-the-workplace.
10. See generally Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology
of Science Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67 (2008) (discussing the meaning of the term “intersectionality”).
11. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
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ists, it is inherently problematic under current judicial interpretations of federal discrimination laws, in which judges analyze each type of discrimination separately (e.g., a discrimination claim on the basis of disability is analyzed separately from
a discrimination claim on the basis of sex) instead of considering the potential multiplicative effects when more than one
type of discrimination is present (e.g., analyzing disability and
12
sex discrimination together). Intersectionality problems may
arise for more than just disabled women; they may arise for
any individual who is a member of multiple protected classes,
13
14
including African-American women and older women.
The focus of this Article, however, will be on the intersectional discrimination encountered by disabled women, who
have been completely ignored by prior intersectional scholarship. This inattention by previous literature does not derive
from the insignificance or rarity of intersectional sex-disability
discrimination; rather, it appears to be a complete oversight by
prior scholars in both law and economics. Even economists who
have studied the employment and wage effects of the ADA have
paid little attention to the fact that the Act appears to have improved conditions for disabled men more than disabled wom15
en. This Article ends the scholarly disregard for the gendered
nature of disability discrimination by using data to demonstrate both the magnitude and the essence of the problem. Relying on confidential data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), this Article is the first to expose
the sex-based gap in disability discrimination charges filed
16
with the agency. On average, women file an absolutely greater

1241 (1991) (discussing intersectional discrimination, particularly as it applies
to African-American women).
12. See infra notes 29–45 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 32–45 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
15. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL.
ECON. 915, 949–50 (2001) (finding that disabled women’s employment declined more than disabled men’s employment after the ADA).
16. In order to sue an employer for disability (or sex) discrimination in
federal court, a worker is first required to exhaust administrative remedies—
that is, to file a charge with the EEOC, to allow the agency at least 180 days to
investigate the charge, and to request a notice-of-right-to-sue letter from the
agency. For an overview of the charge-filing process, see After You Have Filed
a Charge, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (2016), http://www.eeoc.gov/
employees/afterfiling.cfm. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
grounds for dismissal of an employment discrimination lawsuit brought under
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number of ADA charges with the EEOC than do men, and they
file almost 50% more charges per full-time worker than do
17
men. The Article further uses data to consider possible explanations for the gender gap in ADA charge-filing rates, including
the possibility that women are more likely to become disabled
than are men, and the possibility that women are more likely to
18
raise the issue of their disability with employers.
Ultimately, however, this Article will trace the greater
number of ADA charges filed by women to the interaction between disability discrimination and sex discrimination. The Article will demonstrate empirically that ADA charge-filing rates
19
are highest in industries dominated by workers of one sex.
Men are more likely to file ADA charges in female-dominated
industries, and women are more likely to file ADA charges in
male-dominated industries. Because many more industries are
20
male dominated than are female dominated, the result is a
greater overall ADA charge-filing rate by women than by men.
Moreover, a comparison of men’s and women’s charge-filing
rates under the ADA to their charge-filing rates under other
discrimination statutes demonstrates that the charge-filing
pattern among members of the minority sex within an industry
is unique to the ADA. Sex discrimination, it appears, has a
21
uniquely exacerbating effect on disability discrimination.
The empirical analysis presented here sheds light on prior
(but unexplained) results by labor economists, showing that
disabled men have fared better in the labor market during the
22
post-ADA regime than have disabled women. Disabled men
are more likely to experience only one type of employment discrimination (disability), but disabled women are more likely to
experience two types of employment discrimination (disability
either the ADA or Title VII, although the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. See Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 726 F.3d 851, 856 (6th Cir.
2013); Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2010); Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 556 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Parts II.C, II.D.
19. See infra Part II.E.
20. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. Throughout this Article
and supporting data analysis, I focus on the nature of disability discrimination
claims prior to the 2008 ADA Amendments Act. The data available for the
present study solely allow me to make inferences about the pre-ADA Amendments Act period; as additional data become available, developments after the
2008 ADA Amendments Act present a ripe area for future study.
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23

and sex). As long as courts continue to analyze sex discrimination and disability discrimination separately, the ADA is capable of providing a complete remedy to disabled men, but neither
the ADA nor Title VII are capable of providing a complete rem24
edy to disabled women. The real puzzle, then, is finding a legal and feasible way for disabled women to gain a complete
remedy for any discrimination they encounter in the labor
market.
Some intersectional scholars have suggested amending
employment discrimination statutes to provide for intersectional claims explicitly, but this Article argues that such amend25
ments are neither necessary nor practical. The better solution
for sex-disability intersectional discrimination plaintiffs is to
work within the framework of existing statutes when bringing
26
a compound discrimination claim. Nonetheless, such plaintiffs
who seek to prove their cases circumstantially instead of directly—that is, plaintiffs who lack smoking-gun statements from
the employer like the “crippled witch” and “dumb slut” examples mentioned above—may face an uphill battle in terms of
27
proof. Judicially developed proof requirements in employment
discrimination cases may prove particularly difficult to satisfy,
given the unique circumstances faced by disabled women. In
fact, disabled women provide a paramount example as to why
such judicially developed proof requirements, which have already been the subject of much criticism, are so desperately in
28
need of reform.
In making the case for increased attention to and expanded
legal remedies for disabled women who experience labor market discrimination, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews previous work on intersectional discrimination, which,

23. See infra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part IV.A.
26. See infra Part IV.B.
27. See, e.g., Beauchat v. Mineta, 257 F. App’x 463, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) (defining direct evidence of discrimination as including “smoking gun” statements); Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 397 (7th Cir.
1997), overruled by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., No. 15-2574, 2016 WL
4411434 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016) (“‘[S]moking gun’ evidence [is] required for a
direct inference of discriminatory intent.”); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d
413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Absent the evidentiary equivalent of a ‘smoking gun,’
the plaintiff must attempt to prove her case by resort to a burden-shifting
framework.”).
28. See infra Part IV.B.
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heretofore, has focused almost exclusively on the experience of
African-American women. Part II examines the EEOC data,
which details the universe of ADA charges filed with the agency from 2000 to 2009. The EEOC data make clear how men’s
and women’s disability charges differ, and the data also provide
a great deal of evidence as to why men’s and women’s disability
charges differ. Part III considers alternative hypotheses for the
empirical findings in Part II, but ultimately concludes that
women file more ADA charges than do men, because disabled
women encounter more labor market discrimination than do
men. Part IV evaluates the remedies available to disabled
women.
I. THINKING ABOUT INTERSECTIONALITY
The problem of intersectionality is hardly a new topic for
employment discrimination scholars. Relatively early in the
history of Title VII, legal scholars identified this potential
weakness in the prevailing discrimination law framework. One
of the first articles to discuss the need for, and potential difficulties with, intersectional claims came from Elaine Shoben in
1981. Shoben referred to discrimination on the basis of two or
29
more protected classes as “compound discrimination.” Her
conception of intersectional discrimination recognized that
members of two or more protected groups might be “disproportionately exclude[d]” from employment, even when members of
only one protected group experienced favorable employment
30
outcomes. In other words, multidimensional discrimination
might either co-exist with single-dimensional discrimination, or
it might exist despite the absence of single-dimensional discrimination. Focusing particularly on the example of AfricanAmerican women, Shoben acknowledged the difficulties of conceptualizing a compound claim under Title VII’s proof framework, yet she argued that compound claims were nonetheless
31
permissible under the Act.
Nearly a decade later, Kimberle Crenshaw built upon
Shoben’s work in her seminal article on intersectionality, high29. Elaine W. Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race
and Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 793 (1981).
30. Id. at 798.
31. See id. (“This Article argues that overt discriminatory practices
against compound groups have already been recognized as covered by the Act
and that absent a showing of business necessity, Title VII also prohibits unintentionally discriminatory practices adversely affecting compound groups.”).
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lighting the difficulty of attempting to fit the “multidimensionality” of African-American women’s experience into the single32
dimensional framework of U.S. discrimination law. Unlike
Shoben, Crenshaw was far less optimistic about Title VII’s ability to remedy intersectional discrimination, at least under contemporary conceptions of the meaning of discrimination. This
conception, according to Crenshaw, merely viewed “oppression
of Blacks [as] significant when based on race, of women when
33
based on gender.” Using three Title VII cases with race-sex intersectional elements as examples, Crenshaw illustrated how
this single-dimensional framework had coerced AfricanAmerican women to “deny both the unique compoundedness of
their situation and the centrality of their experiences to the
34
larger classes of women and Blacks.” As long as discrimination policies continued to treat different categories of discrimination as “singular issues,” Crenshaw argued that victims of
35
multidimensional issues would remain marginalized.
Crenshaw’s article arguably generated a new field within
discrimination law scholarship, motivating dozens of subse36
quent works—both supportive and critical —on intersectional37
ity. Yet even the supportive scholarship has largely shared
32. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139.
33. Id. at 166.
34. Id. at 150.
35. Id. at 167.
36. One of the most famous critiques of intersectionality came three years
before Crenshaw’s article from Judge Thomas F. Hogan in Judge v. Marsh,
649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986). Here, Judge Hogan noted, “The difficulty
with [allowing intersectional claims] is that it turns employment discrimination into a many-headed Hydra, impossible to contain within Title VII’s prohibition. Following the [intersectionality] rationale to its extreme, protected
subgroups would exist for every possible combination of race, color, sex, national origin and religion.” Id.
37. Accord Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical
Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991,
991–92 (2011) (“[Crenshaw’s] work has inspired two decades of research on
intersectionality in many fields, including critical race theory, stratification,
social psychology, and women’s studies.”); Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality
and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 713 (2015) (“Title VII
was twenty-five years old when Kimberle Crenshaw published her pathbreaking article introducing ‘intersectionality’ to critical legal scholarship. By
the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reached its thirtieth birthday, the
intersectionality critique had come of age, generating a sophisticated subfield
and producing many articles that remain classics in the field of antidiscrimination law and beyond.”).
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Crenshaw’s underlying pessimism regarding courts’ abilities (or
willingness) to accommodate intersectional claims under current discrimination law frameworks. For example, Kathryn
Abrams’s 1994 work on intersectionality highlighted the increased appearance of multidimensional claims in Title VII jurisprudence, but recognized courts’ hitherto inabilities to construct a pathway for incorporating intersectional claims into
Title VII proof structures and analysis. According to Abrams,
Many courts have been unwilling to accommodate these understandings within Title VII doctrine, requiring that claimants disaggregate
and choose among the elements of their identities; others have
awarded relief to complex claimants but failed to give an account of
the discrimination they face that would help integrate such claims in38
to the mainstream of Title VII doctrine.

Later work on intersectionality has been equally dismal.
Over a decade after Abrams’s article, Bradley Areheart again
illustrated the need for intersectional claims in employment
discrimination law. Similar to previous scholars, Areheart focused on the case of African-American women, primarily since
they had served as plaintiffs most often in prior intersectional
39
claim attempts. Yet by 2006, Areheart believed that courts
would not recognize intersectional claims on their own, arguing
that “an amendment to Title VII that would cohere with its
original legislative intent” was needed to remedy the problem
40
of intersectional discrimination. Areheart characterized federal courts as in a state of “confusion” over intersectional claims
and, like Abrams, pointed to courts’ inability to see intersectional claims as anything but “additive,” as opposed to multipli41
cative or compounding.
Although Crenshaw’s, Abrams’s, and Areheart’s characterization of the intersectional case law was qualitative, based on
a close reading of select published cases, subsequent quantitative research has validated their intuitions regarding the trajectory of these claims. Using a sample of federal discrimination cases from 1965 to 1999, a 2011 study by a group of
empirical legal scholars found that single-basis discrimination
38. Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 2479, 2481 (1994).
39. See Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting
a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 199, 202 (2006) (“[T]his Article primarily examines the situation of black women, largely because they
introduced and popularized intersectionality.”).
40. Id. at 201–02.
41. Id. at 228, 234.
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plaintiffs were two times more likely to prevail in federal court
42
than intersectional discrimination plaintiffs. With this finding
in mind, the authors considered three different theories as to
why intersectional plaintiffs might fare so poorly in federal
court: “(1) the categorical nature of discrimination law creates
doctrinal barriers to intersectional claims, (2) there are evidentiary hurdles to demonstrating intersectional discrimination,
and (3) judicial skepticism about intersectional claims may
43
make intersectional plaintiffs less likely to win their cases.”
Based on their empirical analysis, the authors confirmed Crenshaw’s, Abrams’s, and Areheart’s intuition that “judges tend to
believe that intersectional claims can be neatly separated,”
which in turn harmed the plaintiffs whose claims could not be
44
neatly separated.
Considered together, the legal literature advocating for
greater recognition of intersectional discrimination claims has
common threads. Scholars in this area seem to agree that until
more courts begin to recognize the potential for discrimination
to have multiple dimensions, not just a single dimension, certain minority subgroups will continue to be de facto (although,
perhaps, unintentionally) excluded from the protections of discrimination law. Notably, the certain minority subgroup that
has heretofore received the most attention from intersectionality scholars is African-American women. As Areheart pointed
out, much of this scholarly attention undoubtedly arises from
the relative abundance of intersectional claims made by African-American women, compared to other minority subgroups,
45
in published cases. Still, intersectional discrimination has the
potential to affect any individual who is a member of multiple
protected classes, not just African-American women. To the extent that some of these other multiple-minority groups have
been ignored by legal academics, the realities of the discrimination they encounter, or do not encounter, in the labor market
merit further exploration.
One notable exception to the otherwise primary focus on
African-American women in the intersectional discrimination
literature has arisen within recent legal scholarship on mass
incarceration. Well-known, and troubling, are the stark differences between the incarceration rates of African-American men
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Best et al., supra note 37.
Id. at 1018.
Id.
See Areheart, supra note 39.
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and those of white men: African-American men are six times
46
more likely than white men to spend time in prison, leading
some scholars to proclaim this phenomenon as the “New Jim
47
Crow.” Deborah Widiss has argued that mass incarceration
48
may have an intersectional, and illegal, disparate impact on
49
African-American males in employment. Because many employers now use criminal background checks during the hiring
process, Widiss demonstrated through the use of a hypothetical—and the actual disparities in race-sex incarceration
rates—how such practices might result in multidimensional
disparate impact, but not single-dimensional disparate impact:
If [an employer’s criminal background check] policy is evaluated
simply on the basis of race, the passage rates of men and women must
be assessed together: 86% of the black applicants can be considered
for the job, and 98% of the white applicants can be considered for the
job. This is a real disparity, to be sure, but it falls well short of the
EEOC’s rule of thumb for establishing a prima facie case of disparate
impact. The same disparity results if the policy is considered on the
basis of sex alone. But if one considers the passage rates in an intersectional manner—assessing the policy’s effects on black men specifically—the resulting disparities are much greater. Only 76% of the
black men could be considered, a rate that is far lower than that of
any of the other potential groups of comparison (96% of the white
50
men; 96% of the black women; and 100% of the white women).

Besides the extension of intersectional discrimination
analysis beyond African-American women to African-American
men, perhaps the more important contribution of Widiss’s argument is highlighting a need for intersectional disparate im-

46. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 5, 8 (2003) (indicating that in
2001, 5.9% of white men and 32.2% of African-American men were expected to
spend time in prison at some point during their lives).
47. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012). But see James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 21 (2012) (criticizing this characterization).
48. In order for an employer practice to have an illegal disparate impact
under Title VII, the practice must not only disparately (and negatively) affect
a protected class, but also the practice must lack job-relation or business necessity. Unlike a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff need not prove intent
to discriminate to succeed on a disparate impact claim. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–32 (1971).
49. Deborah A. Widiss, Griggs at Midlife, 113 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1009–16
(2015).
50. Id. at 1015–16.
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pact claims, as opposed to the intersectional disparate treat51
ment claims focused on by most prior scholars.
Even though considerations of intersectionality in the context of mass incarceration reflect a broadening beyond considerations particular to disparate treatment particular to African-American women, the argument nonetheless confines
intersectionality claims to individuals who experience overlapping race and sex discrimination. Yet if discrimination on the
basis of race and sex is multiplicative, instead of additive, then
so might be discrimination on the basis of other characteristics
traditionally considered immutable under the law—whether
such characteristics are protected by Title VII or by a different
52
discrimination statute. Indeed, empirical economics scholarship has hinted that intersectional discrimination may span
multiple discrimination statutes, raising inter-statutory concerns, not just intra-statutory ones. Empirical work by Joanne
Song McLaughlin, for instance, found that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act had more beneficial employment ef53
fects for older men than for older women. From her results,
the author concluded that the traditional model of considering
age discrimination and sex discrimination separately might not
sufficiently protect older women in the labor market. Another
54
recent resume-audit study drew similar conclusions, suggesting that age discrimination laws seemed to protect older men
55
adequately, but not older women, in hiring situations.
51. Id. at 1007 (“While later cases have occasionally recognized the possibility of bringing intersectional disparate treatment claims, intersectional disparate impact doctrine has been very little developed.”).
52. For a critique of the immutability considerations present throughout
employment discrimination law, see Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability,
125 YALE L.J. 2 (2015).
53. See Joanne Song McLaughlin, Falling Between the Cracks: Discrimination Laws and Older Women (Oct. 2015) (University at Buffalo, Working
Paper), https://hq.ssrn.com/Conference/Reports/Conf_PreliminaryProgReport
.cfm?conflink=CELS-2015 (scroll down to “10/30/2015 – 10:15 AM, Location:
Room 309, Labor and Employment I”; then follow “Article” hyperlink under
article title and author name).
54. A typical resume audit study sends out fictitious resumes as applications to posted job openings. For a well-known example of a correspondence
study, see Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (describing how sending
out fictitious resumes that are identical, except for having names highly associated with either white or African-American individuals, results in differential treatment of applicants, seemingly based on race).
55. See David Neumark, Ian Burn & Patrick Button, Is It Harder for Old-
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Although economists have of late been interested in the intersection between age and sex discrimination, absent from the
economics scholarship (and the legal scholarship) is any exploration of the intersection between disability and sex discrimination. Nonetheless, a close reading of empirical literature on
the labor market effects of disability discrimination laws should
give scholars a reason to suspect a compounding, or multidimensional, effect. A series of empirical studies on the wage and
employment effects of disability laws, both state and federal, all
indicate that these laws have resulted in unintended consequences—causing, at worst, a decline in or, at best, no im56
provement in labor market outcomes of the disabled. The auer Workers To Find Jobs? New and Improved Evidence from a Field Experiment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21669, 2015), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w21669. The above study found evidence suggestive of
intersectional age and sex discrimination. Id. at 59. However, a separate study
(with the same lead author) did not find evidence suggestive of intersectional
age and disability discrimination. See David Neumark, Joanne Song & Patrick
Button, Does Protecting Older Workers from Discrimination Make It Harder To
Get Hired? Evidence from Disability Discrimination Laws (Nat’l Bureau Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 21379, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w21379 (“This evidence suggests that stronger state disability discrimination
laws do not lower the hiring of non-disabled older workers, using either of two
definitions of disability.”).
56. For instance, the earliest economics scholarship studying the effects of
Title I of the ADA, which prohibits disability discrimination in employment,
found a decline in labor market outcomes of the disabled as a result of the law.
See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 948–50 (suggesting that the
ADA “likely” caused a decrease in the rate of employment of people with disabilities aged twenty-one to thirty-nine); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES
693, 711 (2000) (suggesting that passage of the ADA caused a decrease in the
relative employment of disabled workers). Later studies, which revisit the early results, have argued that the negative estimates may be due to difficulties
in identifying disabled individuals within commonly used datasets and declining labor market participation by the disabled after the ADA. See, e.g., John
Bound & Timothy Waidmann, Accounting for Recent Declines in Employment
Rates Among Working-Aged Men and Women with Disabilities, J. HUM. RESOURCES 231, 245 (2002) (analyzing data from the 1990s regarding the movement of male and female workers with poor health out of the workforce and
onto disability); Julie L. Hotchkiss, A Closer Look at the Employment Impact of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 887, 907–09
(2004) (discussing the employment outcomes of people with disabilities); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of People with Disabilities Following the
ADA, 42 INDUS. REL. 31, 31–33 (2003) (urging caution with regard to findings
on the employment effects of the ADA considering the issues in identifying
who the ADA actually covers). Even so, these later studies, at best, find no improvement in labor market outcomes of the disabled after the ADA. See, e.g.,
Bound & Waidmann, supra, at 244–45 (“Once the rise in the fraction of individuals receiving DI benefits has been accounted for, however, there is little
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thors have explained their results by suggesting the costs that
disability laws impose on employers more than offset any in57
centives the laws create to employ disabled workers.
Although the wage and employment consequences of disability laws have been well considered by economists, few authors have questioned a subtler aspect of their results: differential findings for women and men. For example, according to the
baseline results of one leading study, disabled women ages
twenty-one to thirty-nine worked between 2.37 and 4.57 fewer
weeks in the years following the implementation of the ADA; in
contrast, disabled men ages twenty-one to thirty-nine worked
58
between 0 and 3.11 fewer weeks. In another well-known study
examining the labor market effects of state disability laws, the
authors concluded that disabled women’s earnings declined by
4.9% after passage, but disabled men’s earnings declined by on59
ly 1.5%. In spite of finding consistently worse labor market
outcomes for disabled women than for disabled men, economics
scholars—and legal scholars reading the economics scholarship—have ignored the sex differential, with one exception. The
lone economists to make note of the sex differential, Daron
Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist, suggested that the marginal
benefits of the ADA might have been less for women since
women were already protected against sex discrimination by
60
Title VII. But this explanation conflates sex discrimination
with disability discrimination without any clear reason for doing so; it also fails to recognize that Title VII protects both men
and women against sex discrimination.
A more satisfying explanation for these differential results
may instead lie in the theory of intersectionality. Perhaps disabled women are less aided by disability discrimination laws because, for them, workplace discrimination is multidimensional,
evidence of any effect of the ADA.”); Hotchkiss, supra, at 909 (“It is found that
the unconditional employment probability among disabled people, relative to
among nondisabled people, did not change significantly after implementation
of the ADA.”); Kruse & Schur, supra, at 62 (“These results do not permit a
clear overall answer to the question of whether the ADA has helped or hurt
the employment of people with disabilities, since both positive and negative
signs can be found.”). For a study finding a decline in labor market outcomes
after the passage of state disability laws, see Kathleen Beegle & Wendy A.
Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Disability Discrimination Laws, 38 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 806 (2003).
57. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 915–57.
58. See id.
59. See Beegle & Stock, supra note 56, at 806–59.
60. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15.
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on the basis of disability and sex compounded. For disabled
men, in contrast, discrimination is simply single-dimensional.
When sex discrimination and disability discrimination intersect, discrimination laws—as currently enforced by courts—
would be less capable of protection for precisely the same, wellexplored reasons that discrimination laws are less capable of
protection when race discrimination and sex discrimination intersect. Courts, as noted by prior intersectional scholars, are
predisposed to disaggregation of discrimination claims, requir61
ing independent proof of each type of discrimination alleged.
In the context of sex and disability, such requirements might be
particularly problematic for plaintiffs if an employer treats disabled females poorly, but not disabled males or non-disabled
females. Moreover, such requirements would be problematic
whenever disability discrimination exacerbates already existent sex discrimination (or vice versa). These issues will be explored empirically in the next Part.
II. DISABILITY AND SEX BY THE NUMBERS
This Part represents the principal contribution of this Article, investigating the nature of the relationship, if any, between
sex discrimination and disability discrimination. Section A considers potential data sources for conducting such a study empirically, and Section B details the summary statistics of the
data used in this Article. Sections C, D, and E consider possible
explanations for the relationship between disability discrimination and sex documented in Section B, ultimately arguing that
intersectionality is the driving force behind the empirical results.
A. WHY STUDY EEOC CHARGE DATA?
To examine the intersectionality of sex and disability discrimination empirically requires a data source, yet such a data
source is not readily apparent. Most prior intersectionality
studies, as discussed in the previous Section, have been qualitative or anecdotal in nature, highlighting a handful of federal
cases that the authors have argued are representative of a
61. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 38 (“Many courts have been unwilling to
accommodate these understandings within Title VII doctrine, requiring that
claimants disaggregate and choose among the elements of their identities;
others have awarded relief to complex claimants but failed to give an account
of the discrimination they face that would help integrate such claims into the
mainstream of Title VII doctrine.”).
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62

The one existing empirical study on
larger sample.
intersectionality also relies on a sample of federal cases, suggesting that federal case records may be the appropriate, if not
the only available, data source for empirical work on sex63
disability intersectionality. Nonetheless, two problems render
federal court records not ideal for the present study.
First, the sample of reported federal sex-disability cases is
small, and it is difficult to discern a clear takeaway from them.
In Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., for example, the Tenth
Circuit considered a Title VII-ADA wrongful termination case
64
brought by a female employee with multiple sclerosis. The
plaintiff brought forth evidence that her supervisor had subjected her to different dress code restrictions than her male
coworkers, referred to her as “girlie,” had a history of using racially and sexually derogatory language towards employees,
and fired her immediately after the plaintiff presented a doc65
tor’s note prescribing lifting restrictions. With this evidence,
the court allowed the plaintiff ’s ADA claim, but not her Title
66
VII claim, to go forward.
Contrast Joseph v. HDMJ Restaurant, Inc., a case from the
Eastern District of New York, in which a female plaintiff with a
knee injury sued for wrongful termination and hostile work environment. The plaintiff ’s supervisors had repeatedly demanded oral sex from her, called her racially and sexually derogatory
names, and had physically dragged her down the stairs to ver67
bally abuse her, which exacerbated the injury in her knee.
Even under these outrageous facts, the court allowed the plain68
tiff ’s Title VII claim, but not her ADA claim, to go forward. In
the background of these two cases, in which female plaintiffs
with disabilities have been partially successful, is a list of cases
62. See, e.g., id.; Areheart, supra, note 39; Crenshaw, supra note 32.
63. Best et al., supra note 37.
64. 87 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1996).
65. See id. at 1172.
66. Id.
67. See Joseph v. HDMJ Rest., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 131, 139–41
(E.D.N.Y. 2013).
68. Id. Indeed, it is difficult to find a gender-disability discrimination case
in which a female disabled plaintiff has been wholly successful. Accord Herx v.
Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 772 F.3d 1085, 1086–87 (7th Cir. 2014)
(dismissing employer’s appeal after district court granted its motion for summary judgment on employee’s ADA claim, but not her Title VII claim); Querry
v. Messar, 14 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (allowing a female police
officer to go forward on sex discrimination, but not disability discrimination,
claims).
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in which female plaintiffs with disabilities have been wholly
69
unsuccessful. Thus, a review of the sex-disability discrimination case law, at best, appears to confirm the conclusions of the
prior empirical study on intersectionality more generally, which
found that single-basis discrimination plaintiffs are twice as
likely to prevail in federal court than multiple-basis discrimi70
nation plaintiffs.
Second, and relatedly, studying discrimination through the
lens of reported federal cases raises serious concerns about
71
sample selection bias. Here, the concern is that a nonrepresentative sample of sex-disability cases gets to federal
court (let alone results in a reported decision); thus, any inferences drawn from reported federal cases would not be valid for
the universe of sex-disability discrimination occurrences in the
workplace. For instance, 234,925 Title VII charges and 67,147
ADA charges were filed with the EEOC between 1998 and
72
2001, but during that same period, only 47,249 Title VII cases

69. See, e.g., Johnson v. Weld Cty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2010)
(affirming grant of summary judgment to employer on Title VII and ADA
claims brought by a former female employee with multiple sclerosis); Coffman
v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 561 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming grant
of summary judgment to employer on female firefighter’s Title VII and ADA
claims); Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2002)
(granting judgment as a matter of law to employer on Title VII and ADA
claims after female disabled employee had won a jury verdict); Dechberry v.
N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, 124 F. Supp. 3d 131, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing ADA
and Title VII hostile work environment and adverse employment action claims
brought by female emergency medical technician); Henderson v. Enter. Leasing of Detroit, LLC, No. 13-14892, 2014 WL 1515828, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
18, 2014) (dismissing ADA and Title VII hostile work environment claims
brought by female rental car agent); Aratari v. Genesee Cty. Sheriff ’s Office,
No. 00-CV-0163E(M), 2000 WL 1047701, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000) (dismissing ADA and Title VII wrongful termination claims brought by female
deputy sheriff ).
70. Best et al., supra note 37.
71. Sample selection bias occurs whenever a sample is drawn nonrandomly from the population intended to be studied. For a discussion of the
biases that result from sample selection bias, and an econometric correction
for such bias, see James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification
Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979).
72. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 CHARGES FY 1997 – FY 2015 (2016), http://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (adding together yearly data from
the row labeled “Receipts”); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA) CHARGES FY 1997 – FY
2015 (2016), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm
(adding together yearly data from the row labeled “RECEIPTS”).
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and 7001 ADA cases were filed in federal court. As these statistics illuminate, very few discrimination charges result in a
federal lawsuit, which raises concerns regarding representativeness of the charges that do result in a federal lawsuit. Selection of employment discrimination plaintiffs into filing a federal lawsuit might cut in either direction. On one hand,
employers have a financial incentive to settle the most egregious discrimination claims before a lawsuit is filed since such
claims can result in high damages at trial and, through nega74
tive publicity, can also damage the company’s bottom line. On
the other hand, discrimination victims and the EEOC may have
opposing incentives when the potential for damages is high.
Victims may wish to settle and end the matter quickly; still, the
agency may wish to pursue litigation in order to make an example out of the employer. Nowhere can the agency’s potentially conflicting interests better be seen than in the case considered by the Supreme Court last term, Mach Mining, LLC v.
EEOC, in which the employer-defendant accused the EEOC of
failing to engage in the charge conciliation process before filing
75
a public interest suit. In sum, the farther along in the claim
resolution process a case sample is drawn, the more claims that
will have necessarily dropped out—whether due to settlement
or lack of merit—giving rise to greater concern regarding selection, representativeness, and inferences drawn from the sample.
As a result, the most representative sample of cases should
come from the outset of the claim resolution process, not the
76
end of the process. Since all Title VII and ADA discrimination
lawsuits filed in federal court must first exhaust administrative
remedies—that is, file a charge with the EEOC (or a state fair
employment practices agency) and undergo the agency’s admin73. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429,
434 (2004).
74. See Joni Hersch, Equal Employment Opportunity Law and Firm Profitability, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 139, 139–53 (1991) (finding statistically significant declines in firm valuations after the announcement of a discrimination lawsuit, decision, or settlement).
75. See Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2015) (allowing federal courts to narrowly review whether the EEOC satisfied its statutory
obligation to conciliate a discrimination charge with accused employers).
76. Indeed, as pathbreaking as the 2011 Best et al. empirical study was, it
could only make inferences with regard to intersectionality cases that resulted
in a judicial opinion, not intersectionality cases generally. See Best et al., supra note 37.
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istrative process—the moment of filing a discrimination charge
serves as the necessary starting point for the federal claim res77
olution process. Charge-filing data, therefore, should provide
the fullest and most representative picture of the types of discrimination going on in the workplace, and specifically here, the
incidence of sex-disability intersectional discrimination in the
workplace. Understanding sex-disability intersectional discrimination from agency charge-filing behavior requires more than
just aggregate numbers of total charges filed, however; it requires at least some details regarding the characteristics of
charge-filing parties, the nature of the allegations, and the
meritoriousness of the claims. Yet for privacy reasons, the
EEOC makes only the annual number of ADA and Title VII
charges filed publicly available.
In the absence of useful publicly available data, this study
instead uses confidential data obtained from the EEOC through
a Freedom of Information Act request. The data include at least
some information on each charge filed with the agency between
2000 and 2009, although the data vary year-by-year on the
78
amount of information provided about each charge. The data
also include the full universe of discrimination charges filed
with the agency, including charges filed under the statutes at
issue here (Title VII and the ADA), as well as charges filed under statutes not at issue here (such as the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)). The charges filed between 2000
and 2006, inclusive, contain the most complete information,
with details regarding the characteristics of the alleged discrimination (including the alleged adverse employment actions
and other anti-discrimination statutes at issue), the characteristics of the employer (including the employer’s size, industry,
and location), and the characteristics of the charging party (in79
cluding the party’s race, sex, and national origin). Hence, the

77. See supra note 16 (describing the nuances of the EEOC filing procedure).
78. The confidential EEOC data presented here were first obtained and
used by Joni Hersch and are used by the author with permission. Hersch has
previously used the data in an article on sexual harassment. See Joni Hersch,
Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harassment, 101 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 630 (2011) (providing evidence of the relationship between the
risk of sexual harassment and wages).
79. As described in Joni Hersch’s 2011 article using the same data, see id.,
the data on employer industry become highly problematic after 2006. Because
the EEOC changed how charge intake officers input employer industry into
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complete range of data from 2000 to 2009 will be examined
whenever possible, but most of the empirical results presented
below will focus on the 2000 to 2006 time period.
B. ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN ADA CHARGES BY SEX?
As noted in Part II, economists have consistently found the
wage and employment effects of disability discrimination laws
more harmful for disabled women than for disabled men, so a
natural starting point for the present inquiry is to view any intersection between sex and disability discrimination through
the lens of ADA charges. Figure 1 graphs the number of ADA
charges filed annually, by sex, between 2000 and 2009 and reveals that for the second half of the sample period (2005 to
2009), women filed, in absolute terms, a greater number of
ADA charges than did men. When the time period is considered
as a whole, women on average filed a greater number of ADA
charges per year, filing approximately 8935 charges annually
(compared to the approximately 8923 ADA charges filed by men
80
annually).

the agency’s computer system, a substantial number of post-2006 charges (in
some years, more than half of all charges) are missing information on industry. See id. at 631. For this reason, this Article limits much of the empirical
analysis to the most complete, least problematic charge data, which occurs between the years 2000 and 2006, inclusive.
80. See supra note 78 (introducing Hersch’s confidential dataset used by
the author).
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These findings are surprising given that some disabilities
undoubtedly arise on the job, and yet women, in general, work
81
in less risky jobs than do men. Moreover, comparing the absolute number of charges filed by sex may not be the right metric.
Considering the gap in labor force participation between men
and women—in 2003, for example, there were 14% fewer fe82
male workers in the labor market —and the fact that EEOC
complaints can only be filed by individuals in the labor market,
arguably a more correct metric is comparing the number of perworker charges filed by sex. Figure 2 makes precisely this comparison for the 2000 to 2009 period, illustrating that the number of ADA charges filed per female worker are consistently
higher than the number of ADA charges filed per male worker.

This gender gap only widens after taking into consideration the substantial differential between men’s and women’s
full-time employment rates. In 2003, for instance, there were
81. See Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job
Injury Risks, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 598, 598 (1998) (demonstrating that women
face a job injury risk that is 71% of men’s job injury risk). If the same share of
men and women injured on the job file ADA complaints, then more men than
women should file ADA charges (since more men have on-the-job injuries).
82. Information on the annual number of male and female employees in
the United States comes from Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm#charemp
(scroll down to find “EMPLOYMENT STATUS”; select either “HTML,” “PDF,”
or “XLSX” file format of “2. Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional
population 16 years and over by sex, 1970s to date”) (last visited Nov. 29,
2016) (utilizing data from the years 2000 to 2009 and referencing a 73.5% labor participation rate for men and a 59.5% labor participation rate for women).
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approximately 44% fewer full-time female workers in the labor
83
market. Taking these differences in full-time employment
numbers into account, Figure 3 demonstrates how significantly
the gap between men’s and women’s charges widens once the
metric is the number of ADA charges filed per full-time worker
by sex. As displayed graphically in Figure 3, women’s annual
ADA charge-filing rate per 10,000 full-time female workers has
remained, on average, 42% higher than men’s annual ADA
charge-filing rate per 10,000 full-time male workers. In fact, in
the most recent years of the data, women’s ADA charge-filing
rate per 10,000 full-time workers has persisted at a level more
than 50% higher than the corresponding men’s rate. As all
three figures make clear, the gap between men’s and women’s
ADA charge-filing rates is considerable and enduring, which is
consistent with—although certainly not determinative of—an
intersectionality between sex and disability discrimination.

Indeed, after viewing this sizable, yet previously undocumented, difference between men’s and women’s charge-filing
rates, one question looms large—why are disabled women filing
more ADA charges per worker? The remaining Sections in Part
II will address three potential explanations for the sex differen-

83. See id. (scroll down to find “CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMPLOYED”; select either “HTML,” “PDF,” or “XLSX” file format of “12. Employed persons by sex, occupation, class of worker, full- or part-time status,
and race”).
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tial. The first two hypotheses explore the possibility that the
sex differential is not driven by intersectionality of sex and disability discrimination; in other words, these hypotheses do not
consider whether disability discrimination is exacerbated by
sex discrimination (or vice versa). The first hypothesis behind
the differential examines whether women may be more likely to
be incapacitated by a disability. Even if women are not more
likely to be incapacitated by a disability, the second hypothesis
considers whether women may be more likely to complain
about a disability than men, or whether women may be more
likely to report incidences of disability discrimination than are
men. Finally, the third hypothesis explicitly considers the role
of intersectionality, asking whether disabled women experience
more frequent discrimination in the labor market than do disabled men. After using the available data to evaluate each hypothesis, the remaining text of this Part will argue that the
third hypothesis of intersectionality must prevail, given the interconnectedness of sex and disability discrimination chargefiling rates.
C. ARE WOMEN MORE LIKELY TO BE DISABLED?
To evaluate the validity of the first hypothesis—that women are more likely to become disabled than are men—requires
identifying conditions that solely or disproportionately affect
women. The most obvious reason why women may become disabled at higher rates than men is pregnancy, yet exploring the
relationship between disability and pregnancy requires a more
careful examination of the EEOC charge data. Although the
EEOC charge data do not generally report the charge-filing
party’s underlying disabling condition, the data do include
whether the disability charge is maternity-related and whether
the disability charge was simultaneously filed with a Title VII
pregnancy discrimination charge. Table 1 relays the summary
statistics for the EEOC data on ADA charges filed during the
period of most complete charge information, from 2000 to
84
2006. Table 1 does not suggest any strong connection between
pregnancy and women’s higher rate of disability charge filing:
less than 1% of women’s ADA claims involve maternity, and on-

84. See supra note 79 (detailing why the most complete EEOC charge data
run from 2000 to 2006, which is why most are limited to this time period).
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ly 1.5% of women filing an ADA claim simultaneously file a Ti85
tle VII pregnancy discrimination claim.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of ADA Charges and
Charge-Filing Parties, 2000–2006
Percent of Men’s
Charges

Percent of Women’s
Charges

Demographics:
Nonwhite
34.9
37.8***
Foreign National Origin
11.1
9.4***
Over 40
67.9
65.4***
Large Employer (501+)
41.8
43.2***
ADA Issues Raised:
Termination
56.9
56.1
Accommodation
26.8
32.5***
Hiring
9.3
6.4***
Maternity
0.002
0.2***
Statutes Raised in Charge:
ADA Only
61.4
57.5***
ADA + ADEA
21.8
17.7***
ADA + Title VII
24.6
33.4***
+ Title VII (Sex)
5.7
16.3***
+ Title VII (Pregnancy)
0.03
1.5***
+ Title VII (Race, Black)
9.2
9.7***
N
41,356
39,473
Difference by sex significant at *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level

Of course, other medical conditions besides pregnancy may
incapacitate women at higher rates than men. Women, for ex86
ample, report higher rates of rheumatoid arthritis, although
arthritis does not always limit an individual’s ability to work.
While the EEOC data do not report the charge-filing party’s

85. Given the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Young v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355–56 (2015) (holding that a plaintiff seeking
protection under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act may prove a prima facie
case using the McDonnell Douglas framework), rates of maternity-related
ADA claims will undoubtedly increase in the near future. Nonetheless, the data presented here record high rates of disability charges filed by women many
years before Young arose.
86. Men, on the other hand, report higher rates of heart-related disabilities. See Ctr. for Research on Women with Disabilities, Demographics, BAYLOR
COLL. OF MED., https://www.bcm.edu/research/centers/research-on-women
-with-disabilities/general-info/demographics (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
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underlying disabling condition, data from the 2009–2014 Current Population Survey (CPS), a publicly available dataset administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, can provide
greater insight into the relative rates of functional limitations
in women and men nationwide. Since 2009, respondents to the
CPS March Annual Demographic Supplement have reported
whether they experience difficulty in seeing, hearing, walking,
87
dressing, remembering, or running errands. According to the
CPS data, summarized below in Table 2, men and women self88
report functional limitations at very similar rates. A slightly
larger percentage of men report hearing difficulties, while a
slightly larger percentage of women report difficulties walking
and running errands. Still, the proportion of all men and women reporting at least one of the above functional limitations is
identical at 7.5%. In fact, the percentage of men with work experience reporting at least one functional limitation is slightly
higher than the percentage of women with work experience reporting one. Consequently, the CPS data indicate that women
are no more likely to be functionally limited by a disability than
are men.

87. The CPS March Annual Demographic Supplement is available in a
user-friendly format from the NBER CPS Supplements, NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/data/current-population-survey-data.html
(last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
88. See supra note 86 (introducing NBER CPS Supplements data).
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Table 2: Percent of Population with Self-Reported
Functional Limitations, by Sex and Work History,
2009–2014
Men
Reported Functional
Limitation
Seeing
Hearing
Walking
Dressing
Remembering
Running Errands
One or More
Limitations
N

All Men

1.0
1.9
3.8
1.1
2.7
2.1
7.5

Men
with Work
Experience
5.4
1.3
1.3
0.3
1.0
0.5
3.7

341,804

281,097

Women
All
Women
Women
with Work
Experience
1.1
0.6
1.1
0.8
4.5
1.7
1.2
0.3
2.7
1.0
2.5
0.6
7.5
3.6
370,564

263,770

Note: Estimates calculated from the 2009–2014 CPS Annual Demographic
Supplement for adults ages 18 to 65, inclusive.

The CPS data indicate that women are no more likely to
develop a functional limitation than are men, but perhaps it is
the case that when women do develop such a limitation, it has
a greater impact on their ability to work. For instance, if the
types of functional limitations experienced by women have a
more direct impact on common job tasks than the limitations
experienced by men, then the issue of disability might arise
more frequently for women in the workplace, which in turn,
could lead to their filing disability discrimination charges
against employers at higher rates than men. Yet if the average
disabled woman is more functionally limited for the purposes of
the workplace than the average disabled man, we might also
expect to see a parallel trend in rates of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) enrollment by sex—that is, we might ex89
pect to see more women collecting SSDI. In fact, as seen below
90
in Figure 4, the opposite pattern is apparent in SSDI receipt
by sex, with men consistently collecting disability payments at
89. An interesting comparison might also arise from the total number of
SSDI applications filed by sex. Unfortunately, the sex-differentiated data are
not publicly available. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, & STATISTICS,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 2014, at 145–59 (2015), https://www.ssa
.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2014/di_asr14.pdf (providing data on the outcomes of applications for disability benefits).
90. The data in Figure 4 comes from id.
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higher rates than women. Part of this differential, of course, is
driven by the underlying difference in labor market participation by sex, since only individuals with a work history are eligi91
ble to collect. Still, even after accounting for men’s higher labor market participation rate, men still collect SSDI at higher
rates than do women. Between 1993 (the year Title I of the
ADA went into effect) and 2009, approximately fifty-four men
out of every 10,000 male workers collected SSDI annually, but
only fifty women out of every 10,000 female workers collected
92
SSDI.

In sum, nothing in the data supports the idea that women
are more likely to be disabled than are men. As a group, women
do not experience higher rates of functional limitations than do
men, nor do they experience higher rates of work-related functional limitations than do men. Thus, if higher rates of disability are not driving the higher rates of disability discrimination
charge filing among women, something else must be responsible for the sex differential. The next Section considers a second

91. See Benefits Planner: Social Security Credits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/credits.html#&a0=2 (last visited Nov. 29, 2016)
(describing the Social Security credit structure of eligibility).
92. These estimates were calculated using the numbers in Figure 4 (obtained from the Social Security Administration), see supra note 89, and dividing them by the estimates of total workers, by gender, from the CPS, see supra
note 82.
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possible driver: the idea that women are more willing to raise
the issue of a disability in the workplace.
D. ARE WOMEN MORE LIKELY TO COMPLAIN ABOUT A
DISABILITY?
Another possible explanation for women’s higher ADA
charge-filing rates may be that women are more willing to raise
the issue of their disability with their employer. The stereotype
that women complain more than men is not borne out by the
psychology literature, which instead concludes that men and
93
women complain equally, but about different topics. Still, disability in the workplace may be one of the topics about which
women are more willing to complain to an employer. Suppose,
for instance, that women do not feel as stigmatized by their
disabilities as do men; they may be more willing to speak to
their employer about their disability and to ask for an accommodation as a result. If true, a greater willingness to raise the
issue of disability may translate into differences in the types of
disability claims brought by men and women—women, for example, may raise the issue early on, at the hiring stage or as
soon as their disability poses a problem for their workplace
productivity, while men might wait to raise the issue until their
disability becomes unbearably problematic.
A closer examination of the characteristics of men’s and
women’s disability discrimination charges should provide insight regarding the timing of women versus men making their
disabilities known to employers. Looking back at Table 1, the
clear majority of both men’s and women’s ADA charges allege

93. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 166 (Feb. 2015) (“Among dual-earning couples, the likelihood of reporting work-family conflict has become especially pronounced among fathers.”); Joanna Wolfe & Elizabeth Powell, Gender and Expressions of Dissatisfaction: A Study of Complaining in Mixed-Gendered Student Work Groups,
29 WOMEN & LANGUAGE 13, 13 (2006) (“Women were more likely than men to
use complaints as an indirect request for action, while men were more likely to
use complaints to excuse behavior or to make themselves seem superior.”);
Yinlong Zhang et al., How Males and Females Differ in Their Likelihood of
Transmitting Negative Word of Mouth, 40 J. CONSUMER RES. 1097 (2014)
(finding difference in men’s and women’s willingness to complain to friends
versus strangers); see also Mark Fahey et al., Men Work Longer, Women Complain More: Survey, CNBC (June 29, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/29/
women-feel-more-burned-out-at-work-survey.html (discussing a recent survey
conducted by the Staples Corporation finding that women are more likely to
complain about long work hours than are men, but men’s and women’s primary concerns in the workplace are quite different).
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wrongful termination. Even though a slightly greater percentage (5.7) of women’s ADA charges involve a failure to reasonably accommodate, more men file ADA claims that allege hiring
discrimination. These numbers suggest that female workers
are not, as a group, bringing up the issue of disability with employers earlier than male workers, since at least some men
(and perhaps more men than women) speak to employers about
94
their disabilities as early as the hiring stage.
Furthermore, if it were true that women complain more
about their disabilities to employers, then it should translate
into real differences in the outcomes of women’s and men’s disability discrimination charges. A greater willingness to complain about disability (and about disability discrimination) in
the workplace by one sex should also render workers of that sex
more willing to file discrimination charges in less meritorious
cases. The idea here is that if men are more hesitant than
women to raise the issues of disability and disability discrimination with their employers, then they will only raise such issues (and, if necessary, file a discrimination charge) under the
most egregious of circumstances. The result would be that
men’s disability discrimination charges, on average, would be
more meritorious than women’s disability discrimination
charges, and in turn, more successful in obtaining relief than
women’s charges. But in fact, examining the actual EEOC
charge data reveal no systematic differences in the outcomes of
men’s and women’s disability discrimination charges. For each
disability discrimination charge in the 2000 through 2009
EEOC data, the agency intake officer assigned an initial rat95
ing. After briefly reviewing the facts of the alleged discrimina-

94. Table 1 may suggest that more men than women are raising the issue
of their disability at the hiring stage, since more men than women ultimately
file hiring discrimination charges based on disability. Nonetheless, caution
must be taken in reading too much into the numbers in Table 1 since they represent only men and women who raised the issue of disability with employers
and subsequently experienced an adverse employment action. Suppose more
women actually raise the issue of disability at the hiring stage, but employers
are more likely to accommodate and hire women than men who raise the issue
of disability at hiring. If true, the numbers in Table 1 could result, with more
men claiming hiring discrimination on the basis of disability, even though
more women raise the issue of disability at the hiring stage.
95. Discrimination charges are typically filed in person during an intake
appointment at the EEOC. They may, however, be filed by mail. Regardless of
how a worker chooses to file a discrimination charge, each charge is initially
assigned to and assessed by an agency intake officer. For a description of the
charge filing process, see How To File a Charge of Employment Discrimina-
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tory incident during the charge intake appointment, the officer
designated the discrimination charge as one of the following:
“A: Likely reasonable cause,” “B: Need to investigate,” or “C:
Likely to dismiss for no reasonable cause.” The breakdown of
intake charge ratings, by sex, is shown below in Figure 5.

As Figure 5 makes clear, men’s and women’s charge intake
ratings are quite similar. The majority of charges are B-rated,
regardless of sex of the charge-filing party. Moreover, a slightly
greater percentage of men’s disability charges are C-rated. As
long as EEOC intake officers’ assessments of discrimination
charge merit are generally accurate, Figure 5 appears to refute
any notion that men’s disability charges, on the whole, are
more meritorious than women’s charges. Further supporting
this conclusion is evidence from a smaller subset of the EEOC
charge data. Each charge in the 2000 through 2006 EEOC data
contains information on the agency’s final determination of
96
charge merit at the end of its investigation process. Figure 6,

tion, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/
employees/howtofile.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
96. According to the EEOC, “How we investigate a charge depends on the
facts of the case and the kinds of information we need to gather. In some cases, we visit the employer to hold interviews and gather documents. In other
instances, we interview witnesses and ask for documents. After we finish our
investigation, we will let you and the employer know the result.” See What You
Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016). The
agency claims on its website that charges, on average, take approximately ten
months to investigate. See id. However, the average charge investigation peri-
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below, compares the final agency determination of disability
discrimination charges by sex. More than half of all ADA
charges are dismissed after investigation by the EEOC for no
reasonable cause, although the dismissal rate is higher for men
97
than for women. 57.62% of men’s disability charges result in
dismissal, compared to 55.92% of women’s disability charges;
furthermore, this 1.70 percentage point difference in dismissal
rates by sex is statistically significant at the 1% level.

Together, Figures 5 and 6 indicate that men’s lower disability charge-filing rates are not the result of men’s willingness
to file charges only for the most egregious of discriminatory incidents. Men’s and women’s disability discrimination charges,
on average, are equally meritorious. The fact that men’s and
women’s disability charges are equally meritorious when considered as a whole—but women are filing more disability discrimination charges than are men—gives rise to a third, and
final, explanation for women’s higher charge-filing rates: disaod can vary dramatically by field office (that is, how sufficiently a field office is
staffed and funded). Telephone Interview with Katharine Kores, Dist. Dir. of
Memphis Office, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (Jan. 9, 2012) (estimating that charges in her office, on average, take approximately one year to
investigate).
97. Of course, charge dismissal for no reasonable cause by the EEOC does
not prevent the charge filer from suing the employer. The charge filer may still
request a notice-of-right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, even if his or her charge
has been dismissed by the agency for no reasonable cause. See Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/
employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
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bled women encounter greater discrimination in the labor market than do disabled men.
E. ARE WOMEN MORE LIKELY TO BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST
BECAUSE OF A DISABILITY?
Without strong empirical evidence to support either the
hypothesis that women are more likely to become disabled or
the hypothesis that women are more likely to complain or leave
work because of a disability, a final question arises: Do disabled
women experience greater discrimination in the labor market
than disabled men? The idea is not completely without precedent. Using data from the 1980s, economists Marjorie Baldwin
and William Johnson demonstrated that disabled men earned
higher wages than did disabled women—even after taking into
account other observables such as education, occupation, and
experience—leading the authors to conclude that disabled
women might face a “double burden of discrimination” in the
98
labor market. Although Baldwin and Johnson’s study was
groundbreaking, unclear from their results was whether sex
discrimination and disability discrimination were additive or
compounding in nature. If additive, then the current legal
treatment of sex discrimination and disability discrimination
separately would be appropriate; compounding discrimination,
on the other hand, would lead to precisely the same types of issues discussed throughout the legal scholarship on
99
intersectionality.
Figure 7 takes a significant step towards resolving the nature of the relationship between sex discrimination and disability discrimination. Using the 2000 through 2006 EEOC charge
data—the subset of the data that contains the industry of the
100
charge-filing party —Figure 7 graphs the number of charges
filed per 10,000 workers, by sex and industry. The industries in
Figure 7 are ordered quite intentionally: beginning with the
most female-dominated industry, health care (where females
98. See Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Women with Disabilities, 34 INDUS. REL. 555, 575 (1995).
99. Although Baldwin and Johnson concluded that gender discrimination
was no worse for disabled women than it was for non-disabled women, the authors suspected that gender and disability discrimination had a compounding
effect, not an additive effect. See id. (“[E]fforts to reduce discrimination
against women with disabilities will not be effective if they are based on the
idea that gender is irrelevant.”).
100. See supra note 78 (introducing Hersch’s confidential dataset used by
the author).
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comprised 79.4% of the workforce in 2003), and ending with the
most male-dominated industry, construction (where females
101
comprised only 9.6% of the workforce in 2003). The underlying reasoning behind this ordering is to test whether reported
instances of disability discrimination increase as the likelihood
of sex discrimination increases. A wealth of empirical scholarship indicates that sex discrimination is most pervasive for
women working in male-dominated arenas and least pervasive
102
for women working in female-dominated arenas.

101. The percent of men in each industry is as follows: health care (21%),
educational services (31%), finance and insurance (41%), accommodation
(47%), other services (49%), retail trade (51%), real estate (53%), public administration (54%), arts (55%), professional services (55%), information (57%),
management (60%), manufacturing (69%), wholesale trade (70%), agriculture
(75%), transportation (75%), utilities (77%), mining (86%), and construction
(90%). Data on the gender makeup of each major industry comes from the
midpoint year, 2003, of the CPS. Labor Force Statistics: Employed Persons by
Industry, Sex, Race, and Occupation, BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls.gov/
cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#emp (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
102. See, e.g., Hersch, supra, note 78, at 633 (finding that sexual harassment charge-filing rates are highest for women in male-dominated industries).
See generally Peter Glick et al., What Mediates Sex Discrimination in Hiring
Decisions?, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 178, 184–86 (1988) (concluding that sex stereotyping is mediated when the sex of the applicant matches
perceptions of the appropriate sex for the job); Jennifer Steele et al., Learning
in a Man’s World: Examining the Perceptions of Undergraduate Women in
Male-Dominated Academic Areas, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 46, 49–50 (2002)
(reporting that female undergraduates in male-dominated majors report higher rates of discrimination and stereotyping).
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Figure 7 is highly suggestive that sex discrimination and
disability discrimination have a compounding, not an additive,
effect. For men working in health care and education, where
women comprise more than two-thirds of the workforce, men
file 27.5% and 45.6% more charges per worker than women, respectively. In industries where men and women make up similar percentages of the workforce, men and women file almost
identical numbers of ADA charges per worker. On the other
hand, women working in industries where they are severely
underrepresented—such as agriculture, mining, and construction—file 118.9%, 84.8%, and 176.4% more ADA charges per
worker, respectively. Since perceived riskiness of jobs in the education industry may be low, while perceived riskiness of jobs
103
in the construction and mining industries may be high, one
potential alternative reading of this pattern in charge-filing
rates is that women’s disability charge-filing rates are positive103. Of course, perceived job riskiness may not match actual job riskiness.
See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and
Industry, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29, 29–30 (2004) (contrasting the value of statistical life studies that use objective job risk measures versus subjective job risk
measures).
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ly correlated with job risk, and men’s disability charge-filing
rates are inversely correlated with job risk.
Yet this alternative explanation loses its footing once the
104
actual riskiness of jobs, by industry, is explored. The current
“gold standard” of actual job risk data by industry comes from
105
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS collects annual data on both nonfatal workplace injuries (through the Survey of Occupational Illnesses and Industries (SOII) data) and
fatal workplace injuries (through the Census of Fatal Occupa106
tional Injuries (CFOI) data). According to the 2003 SOII data,
the female-dominated health care industry has one of the highest rates of nonfatal workplace injuries, with 650 nonfatal injuries per 10,000 workers, just behind construction (680 injuries),
mining (680 injuries), and transportation and warehousing (780
107
injuries). Similarly, the 2003 CFOI data reveal that the maledominated information (56.5% male) and manufacturing (69.4%
male) industries have some of the lowest fatality rates of any
industry, with rates of 0.18 and 0.25 fatalities per 10,000 work108
For comparison, the female-dominated
ers, respectively.
health care and education industries have rates of 0.07 and
109
0.12 fatalities per 10,000 workers, respectively. And yet, Figure 7 reveals many more women than men file disability discrimination charges in the information and manufacturing industries.
Instead of tracking underlying job risk, the pattern of disability charge-filing rates by sex most closely tracks the probability of encountering sex discrimination on the job. Figure 7
reveals that the pattern is not only apparent for women, but also for men. Men file more disability charges per worker in the
two industries where they are most severely underrepresented,
104. Accord Hersch, supra note 81, at 606 (concluding that women face
much greater risks in the workplace than previously believed and that “their
injury experience is considerable”).
105. For a description of the different types of occupational risk data available, see W. Kip Viscusi, Policy Challenges of the Heterogeneity of the Value of
Statistical Life, 6 FOUND. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 99, 138–48 (2011).
106. Summary statistics from both annual datasets are available from the
BLS website. See Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities (2016), BUREAU LAB.
STATS., http://www.bls.gov/iif (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
107. See Industry Injury and Illness Data (2003), BUREAU LAB. STATS,
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshsum.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
108. See Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) – Current and Revised Data (2003), BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
109. See id.
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education and health care. The reason that, on average, women
file more disability discrimination charges per worker than do
men (as seen previously in Figures 1, 2, and 3) is because there
are more industries in which women are the minority. This idea
that disability discrimination serves to exacerbate underlying
sex discrimination in the workplace is further driven home in
Figure 8. Figure 8 graphs the percentage of ADA charges filed
with the EEOC from 2000 to 2006 that simultaneously include
a Title VII sex discrimination charge, by industry and sex.
Again, the industries are ordered from the most femaledominated industry to the most male-dominated industry.

Figure 8 indicates a similar inverse relationship between
the likelihood of filing a Title VII sex charge (in addition to the
ADA charge) and representation of a disabled individual’s sex
in the industry. Thus, in the health care industry, where nearly
four out of five employees are female, a slightly greater percentage of men file a Title VII sex charge in addition to an ADA
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110

charge. As the percentage of male employees in the industry
increases, men filing an ADA charge are less likely to file a
simultaneous Title VII sex charge, and women filing an ADA
charge are more likely to file a simultaneous Title VII sex
charge. The gap between male and female charges that allege
both disability and sex discrimination is widest in the industries that are strongly male-dominated, such as mining and
construction.
Furthermore, this relationship between filing an ADA
charge and a Title VII sex discrimination charge holds even after accounting for the effects of other, potentially correlated, observables. Table 3 reports the results of a linear probability es111
timate of the likelihood of filing a Title VII sex discrimination
charge in addition to an ADA charge, using the 2000 to 2006
EEOC charge data. After controlling for differences in race, age,
national origin, employer characteristics (government employer,
large employer, or employer region), and the year of charge filing, women in industries that are 50 to 66% male (“malemajority industries” in Table 3) are 11.5 percentage points more
likely than men in these industries to file a Title VII sex discrimination charge in addition to their ADA charge. Women in
industries that are more than 66% male (“male-dominated industries” in Table 3) are 18.8 percentage points more likely
than men in these industries to file a Title VII sex discrimina112
tion charge in addition to their ADA charge. Although caution
must be exercised in interpreting these results causally, these
linear probability estimates are nonetheless enlightening, because they show that the compounding relationship between
disability discrimination and minority gender status in an industry persists even after accounting for additional, potentially
correlated characteristics of ADA charge-filing parties.
110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
111. A linear probability model estimates the relationship between a variable of interest (here being a woman in a male-dominated industry) on the
probability of an outcome of interest (here filing a Title VII sex charge in addition to an ADA charge) using ordinary least squares estimation. For more information on linear probability models, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 665–727 (7th ed. 2012) (comparing the linear probability model
to probit and logit models, which are also used to estimate probabilities).
112. Estimates are constructed to examine the probability of a woman filing a Title VII sex charge (in addition to an ADA charge), relative to a man
filing a Title VII sex charge, since women are the minority in more industries
than are men. The estimates could easily be reversed, however, to estimate
instead the probability of filing a Title VII sex charge (in addition to an ADA
charge) among men in female-dominated industries.

1136

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1099

Table 3: Linear Probability Estimate of Filing a Title
VII Sex Discrimination Charge Among Individuals
Who File an ADA Charge, 2000–2006
Dependent Variable: File Title VII
Sex Charge
Female
0.081***
(0.003)
Nonwhite
-0.006**
(0.003)
Over 40
-0.006**
(0.003)
Male-Majority Industry
-0.001
(0.003)
Male-Dominated Industry
-0.022***
(0.003)
Female*Male-Majority Industry
0.034***
(0.005)
Female*Male-Dominated Industry
0.107***
(0.009)
N
63,048
2
R
0.035
Coefficient significant at *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level
Notes: Estimates include controls for foreign national origin, large employer (501+), government employer, region of employer, and year filed.
Male-majority industries are 50 to 66% male. Male-dominated industries
are more than 66% male.

Taken together, the empirical findings presented in this
Section strongly suggest that sex and disability discrimination
intersect much in the same, well-documented way that race and
sex discrimination intersect. The unfortunate results of this intersection for disabled female workers, and particularly disabled female workers in male-dominated industries, are discriminatory wage and employment effects that far surpass their
disabled male peers. In light of the data presented here, the
next Part steps back and considers alternative explanations for
the sex-disability discrimination connection, but ultimately
concludes that it is intersectionality that renders the effects of
labor market discrimination particularly harsh for disabled
women.
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III. CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR
THE SEX-DISABILITY CONNECTION
Skeptics of the intersectionality theory might view the data
presented in the previous Part and remain unconvinced that
sex discrimination exacerbates disability discrimination in the
workplace. Alternative explanations, such skeptics might argue, could easily explain the relationship between likelihood of
filing a disability discrimination charge and the sex ratio in a
worker’s industry. This Part considers two of the most compelling alternative explanations for the gendered nature of disability discrimination: (1) the propensity of sex discrimination
charge filers to file a discrimination charge on as many grounds
as possible; and (2) the role of the built environment in the
workplace. Nonetheless, even after thorough consideration,
these alternative explanations fail to fully explain the relationship between sex and disability discrimination documented in
Part II.
A. THE ROLE OF EVERYTHING BUT THE KITCHEN SINK
Perhaps the most obvious alternative explanation for the
sex-disability discrimination charge-filing connection presented
in Part II is one that relies on both women’s relative propensity
to file a discrimination charge of any type against their employers and the behavior of charge filers during the intake process.
This alternative explanation proceeds in the following manner:
workers, whether male or female, who believe they have been
discriminated against in the workplace seek retribution against
offending employers. As a result, when these workers file a discrimination charge with the EEOC, they are motivated to ensure that the employer is found liable for at least some type of
wrongdoing. With seemingly nothing to lose by claiming multi113
ple grounds of discrimination, workers are motivated to check
every box on the charge intake form—alleging everything but
the kitchen sink—and claim that the offending employer engaged in every type of prohibited discrimination. Although all
charge-filers engage in this kitchen-sinking behavior, regardless of sex, there are more female charge filers since sex dis-

113. One questionable aspect of this hypothesis is that charge filers have
nothing to lose by checking every box on the EEOC’s charge intake form. If
charge filers claim all types of discrimination—including types of discrimination that they did not actually experience—it may cause the agency to take the
charge less seriously.
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crimination is more common against women than against
114
men. The end result is that more women file disability discrimination charges against employers simply because they file
more discrimination charges in general. Moreover, according to
this alternative explanation, the relationship between industry
sex ratio and disability charge-filing rates should not be surprising since women experience more sex discrimination in
male-dominated industries, and women’s higher rates of sex
discrimination charge filing are driving the entire mechanism.
Evaluating the validity of this hypothesis requires first determining the ratio of female to male discrimination chargefilers. It is true that the strong majority of Title VII sex discrimination charges are filed by women; between 2000 and
2009, the EEOC received 246,367 charges that raised a Title
115
VII sex discrimination claim. Of the filings for which the party’s sex is reported (sex is not reported for 5406, or 2.19% of the
sex discrimination charges), 50,382 charges were filed by men
(20.91% of charges) and 190,579 charges were filed by women
(79.09% of charges). However, when the data are analyzed
across all relevant statutes—including other types of Title VII
claims, the ADA, the ADEA, and GINA—it is not true that
women file disproportionately more charges than men. Between
2000 and 2009, the EEOC received charges from 886,383
116
unique charge filers under all statutes that it administers. Of
the charges in which the filing party’s sex is reported (sex is not
reported for 27,296, or 3.08%, of all 886,383 unique charge filers), 471,563 of all charge filers were female (53.20%), and
387,524 of all charge filers were male (46.80%). Already, the
close to fifty-fifty split of male-to-female charge filers calls this
alternative hypothesis into question.
Nonetheless, the next step in evaluating this alternative
hypothesis is determining whether charge-filers kitchen sink
their claims and whether such behavior differs meaningfully by
sex. According to the 2000 through 2009 data for which sex is
117
reported, men’s EEOC charges, on average, raise 1.18 unique

114. Sex discrimination is in fact more common against women than men,
but it is nonetheless an issue for men in many workplaces—over 20% of all Title VII sex discrimination charge filers are men.
115. See Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
116. See id.
117. Sex is reported in 96.92% of the 2000 through 2009 EEOC data.
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statutes; women’s EEOC charges, by contrast, raise an average
of 1.20 unique statutes. Although this difference is statistically
different at the 5% level, the magnitude of the difference is undoubtedly quite small. Moreover, these summary statistics do
not provide very compelling evidence of systematic, kitchensinking behavior by charge filers of either sex. Nor is there
strong evidence of kitchen sinking at the ends of the chargefiler distribution. The median charge-filer, whether male or female, raises only one statute in his or her charge. Similarly,
charge filers in both the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles of the distribution raise just one statute, regardless of
their sex. Considered together, these figures indicate that
kitchen-sinking behavior is the exception, not the rule, in
EEOC charge filing.
A final method of assessing this alternative hypothesis is
to examine EEOC charge-filing behavior by sex with respect to
other employment discrimination statutes. The kitchen-sinking
hypothesis claims that women file more disability charges per
worker than do men because women encounter more sex discrimination in the workplace than do men. Instead of simply
filing a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC, these women
allegedly kitchen sink their charges, which, in turn, leads to
higher rates of disability claims among women. But if this hypothesis is true, not only should higher rates of disability discrimination charges result among women, but also higher rates
of other types of discrimination charges. Thus, a fair comparison will be to examine how age discrimination charge-filing
118
rates differ by sex, as compared to how disability discrimination charge-filing rates differ by sex. From 2000 to 2009, men
filed an average of 10,595 ADEA charges per year, but women
filed only an average of 8933 ADEA charges per year. For comparison, during the same time period, men filed an average of
8923 ADA charges per year, and women filed an average of
119
8935 ADA charges per year. Thus, while women filed more
ADA charges than men during this time period, men filed far
more ADEA charges than women during this period.
Even when these absolute numbers are normalized to account for the fewer number of women in the labor market, the
opposite trends remain in the ADEA and ADA data. From 2000
118. Recall that the sex-age connection has already received scholarly attention. See Clarke, supra note 52; McLaughlin, supra note 53 and accompanying text; Widiss, supra note 49.
119. See supra Figure 2.
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to 2009, men filed 1.42 ADEA charges per 10,000 male workers,
and women filed 1.36 ADEA charges per 10,000 female workers. In contrast, men filed 1.19 ADA charges per 10,000 male
workers, but women filed 1.36 ADA charges per 10,000 female
workers. Together, these figures refute the notion that women’s
higher ADA charge-filing rates are simply a byproduct of their
higher sex discrimination charge-filing rates, combined with
kitchen-sinking behavior. Instead, these figures point towards
a unique intersectionality between sex and disability that is
disparately affecting disabled women in the labor market.
B. THE ROLE OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
A second alternative explanation for the higher disability
charge-filing rates by gender minorities is the built environment within the industry. Here, the term “built environment”
120
signifies the physical features of the workplace. At least one
legal scholar has argued that American workplace environ121
ments have been built with men in mind, and likely that assertion is true for the many industries in which men comprise
the majority of workers. The argument may not be true, however, for industries like education and health, in which women
comprise a strong majority of the workers. Instead, the environment within a workplace dominated by one sex has likely
been built with that particular sex in mind. For instance, the
expected height of desks and chairs and the availability of
women’s restrooms is probably quite different in workplaces
120. The term is frequently used by health researchers to refer to:
spatial distribution of human activities[,] . . . the physical infrastructure and services that provide the spatial links or connectivity among
activities[, and] . . . the aesthetic, physical, and functional qualities of
the built work environment, such as the design of buildings and
streetscapes, and relates to both land use patterns and the transportation system.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Workplace Health Promotion:
Environmental Assessment, http://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/
model/assessment/environmental.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2016); see also Alva O. Ferdinand et al., The Relationship Between Built Environments and
Physical Activity: A Systematic Review, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Oct. 2012, at
e7, e7–e13. See generally Richard J. Jackson, The Impact of the Built Environment on Health: An Emerging Field, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1382 (2003)
(detailing the role of the “built environment” in the public health field).
121. See Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodating the Female Body: A Disability
Paradigm of Sex Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1297, 1314–15 (2008)
(discussing how work environments have been traditionally built for men, and
considering the ramifications of the traditionally built environment on accommodating disabled women in the workplace).
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within the education or healthcare industries than in work122
places within the transportation or construction industries.
As a result, disabled women in male-dominated industries
may require additional or costlier accommodations than disabled women in female-dominated industries. Imagine, for instance, a male worker and a female worker in the manufacturing industry; both have irritable bowel syndrome and require
frequent, easy access to a restroom. Since more than two-thirds
of the workers in the manufacturing industry are male, men’s
restrooms likely abound in the work facility, and the employer
will have to spend little to nothing to ensure that the male
worker has sufficient restroom access. In contrast, accommodating the female worker may prove more difficult, and more
costly, since the number of men’s restrooms in the facility al123
most certainly outnumbers the number of women’s restrooms.
As the above example demonstrates, employers in maledominated industries may be less willing to provide accommodations to disabled females because of the high initial cost to
provide the accommodation and because of the reduced likelihood that another woman will be able to take advantage of the
accommodation in the future, given the small number of women
overall in the industry. If this intuition is correct, then the built
environment of the workplace may be driving the higher disability charge rates of gender minorities. A worker of one sex in
an industry that is strongly dominated by the opposite sex may
be met with heightened resistance from employers whenever
the need for a reasonable accommodation arises. The result
would be more sex-minority members within an industry filing
reasonable accommodation claims than sex-majority members.
In essence, this hypothesis implies that differences in reasonable accommodation discrimination charges are driving the sexbased charge patterns seen by industry in Figure 7.
If the built environment theory is correct, then the sex disparities in charge-filing rates across industries should be driven, at least in part, by differences in reasonable accommodation
claims. Figure 9 uses the 2000 through 2006 EEOC charge data
122. In fact, unequal availability of women’s restrooms has been the subject of prior litigation. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Toilets as a Feminist Issue: A
True Story, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 276–87 (1991).
123. Restroom access has been the subject of much ADA reasonable accommodation litigation brought by irritable bowel syndrome patients. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 753–55 (6th Cir. 2015); Workman v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 463–64 (6th Cir. 1999); Bracey v. Michigan Bell
Tel. Co., No. 14-12155, 2015 WL 9434496, at *1–4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2015).
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to compare the rate of raising an accommodation claim within
an ADA charge, by sex of the charge-filing party and industry
(with industries ordered from least male-dominated to most
male-dominated). Figure 9 is similar to Figure 7, but instead of
comparing the total number of ADA charges by industry and
sex (as in Figure 7), Figure 9 compares the percent of ADA
charges that contain a reasonable accommodation charge.

Figure 9 reveals that women raise accommodation claims
124
at higher rates than men, regardless of industry, and there is
no apparent relationship between likelihood of filing an accommodation charge and the gender makeup of a worker’s industry. Figure 9 casts doubt on the hypothesis that the built
environment in the workplace is strictly driving the results in
Figure 7. Neither men nor women appear more likely to seek
(and be turned down for) accommodation in industries where
their sex is heavily outnumbered.

124. Recall from Table 1 that the EEOC charge data summary statistics in
the Table had already revealed that women, on average, file more reasonable
accommodation charges than do men, but men file more hiring charges than
do women.
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With doubt cast on both the built environment and the
kitchen-sinking hypotheses, the residual hypothesis is
intersectionality. The multiplicative effect of being a member of
more than one minority group appears to be responsible for the
gendered nature of disability discrimination. The next Part, as
a result, will consider the realities of intersectional claims under current understandings of employment discrimination
laws. It will further weigh the potential remedies for victims of
simultaneous sex and disability discrimination.
IV. FINDING A REMEDY FOR SEX-DISABILITY
INTERSECTIONALITY
Using employment discrimination charge data from the
EEOC, this Article has revealed a previously unexplored weakness in U.S. disability laws. Disability discrimination, it seems,
is not isolated from other types of discrimination; rather, it can
be exacerbated by other forms of discrimination, and in particular, by sex discrimination. The compounding effect of disability
discrimination on top of sex discrimination can impact both
men and women, but as a practical matter, it impacts more
women than men. It is most often present when a disabled individual of one sex works in an industry dominated by members of the other sex, and when present, can have potentially
devastating labor market consequences on its victims.
Why are the labor market consequences of sex and disability intersectional discrimination potentially devastating? As either a disabled individual or a member of a minority sex, a
worker is already at a disadvantage in the labor market. Even
in the post-ADA period, disabled individuals continue to be less
likely to be hired than non-disabled individuals, and when they
do find employment, they earn lower wages than non-disabled
125
individuals for performing the same job. Similarly, even in
125. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 948–50 (finding that
the disability employment penalty in the labor market persists, and may have
gotten worse, after the passage of the ADA); see also Marjorie L. Baldwin &
William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with Disabilities in the Year of the ADA, 66 S. ECON. J. 548, 561–64 (2000) (finding that
physical limitations cannot fully account for the wage penalty encountered by
disabled men in the labor market, and demonstrating a correlation between
wages and stigma associated with the underlying disability); Jennifer Bennett
Shinall, What Happens When the Definition of Disability Changes? The Case of
Obesity, 5 IZA J. LAB. ECON., 1, 1–31 (2016) (demonstrating that employment
for at least one disabled group has not improved since the passage of the 2008
ADA Amendments, which were intended to remedy the shortcomings of the
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the post-Title VII period, women famously continue to earn less
126
than men for performing the same job. Just to add these effects up for members of both minority groups—that is, individuals who are both disabled and a member of an unrepresented
sex—would already suggest that these individuals face a formidable barrier to success in the labor market. Yet, as demonstrated by this Article, for disabled sex minorities the effects
are more than additive; they are multiplicative.
Furthermore, neither federal disability discrimination law
nor federal sex discrimination law, as currently enforced, can
adequately assist victims of intersectional sex-disability discrimination. Wage and employment data both demonstrate that
disabled women are worse off since the ADA, at least in terms
127
of labor market outcomes, than are disabled men. These data
indicate that the current single-dimensional framework of U.S.
disability law may be inadequate to protect disabled men in the
workplace, and it is certainly inadequate to protect disabled
128
women. The framework is insufficient for disabled women,
because, as the empirical evidence presented here has demonstrated, disabled women face problems created by claim
intersectionality that are analogous to the well-explored prob-

original Act).
126. Exactly how much less women earn than men for performing the same
job is the source of some debate. President Barack Obama and the media often
cite the popular statistic that women earn seventy-seven cents for every dollar
that a man earns. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by
the President on Equal Pay for Equal Work (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/08/remarks-president-equal-pay
-equal-work (“Today, the average full-time working woman earns just 77
cents for every dollar a man earns; for African-American women, Latinas, it’s
even less. And in 2014, that’s an embarrassment. It is wrong.”). Yet most
economists would revise this figure upwards since this number does not take
into account differences in the occupations, industries, and working hours of
men and women. See, e.g., Dan A. Black et al., Gender Wage Disparities Among
the Highly Educated, 43 J. HUM. RESOURCES 630, 651 (2008) (estimating that
white women earn approximately ninety-one cents for every dollar that a
white man earns).
127. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 15, at 930 (finding that disabled
women ages twenty-one to thirty-nine worked between 2.37 and 4.57 fewer
weeks in the years following the implementation of the ADA but disabled men
ages twenty-one to thirty-nine worked between 0 and 3.11 fewer weeks);
Beegle & Stock, supra note 56, at 853 (finding that disabled women’s earnings
declined by 4.9% after passage of a state disability law, but disabled men’s
earnings declined by only 1.5%).
128. Accord Baldwin & Johnson, supra note 98, at 575 (“[E]fforts to reduce
discrimination against women with disabilities will not be effective if they are
based on the idea that gender is irrelevant.”).
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lems faced by African-American women. As prior authors have
aptly described for the case of African-American women,
[A]n employer might be willing to hire black men and white women as
retail salespeople but unwilling to hire black women because he
thinks that customers will stereotype them in disparaging ways that
will harm his business. . . . Their employees might make what we call
intersectional claims: allegations that they were discriminated
against due to more than one ascriptive characteristic. But since these types of discrimination would not affect minority men or white
women, under some interpretations of EEO law, the employer could
parry a claim of race discrimination by pointing to the hiring of men
belonging to the plaintiffs’ racial group and deflect a claim of sex dis129
crimination by pointing to his hiring of white women.

A disabled woman will face precisely the same issue in trying to bring a suit that involves evidence of simultaneous sex
and disability discrimination. An employer could point to evidence of taking positive employment actions towards disabled
men to discredit the disability claim; the employer could then
bring forth evidence of positive treatment of nondisabled women to discredit the sex claim. If the employer’s evidence is convincing on each front, the disabled woman will lose. She will
lose because, in general, courts will only consider workplace
discrimination against her based on each single dimension, not
130
on multiple dimensions.
Undoubtedly, the lessons of this Article are pessimistic for
the labor market prospects of disabled workers who are also
gender minorities within their respective industries. If current
understandings of employment discrimination law are insufficient to protect these workers, how can these workers improve
their legal fate (and, as a result, improve their labor market
prospects)? The possible legal solutions to the intersectional
discrimination issues faced by disabled, gender-minority workers are, in one respect, highly similar to those for AfricanAmerican women. Both groups require a way to get around
courts’ unwillingness to view discrimination on more than a
single dimension. Yet in another respect, the solution for disa-

129. Best et al., supra note 37, at 995; see also Peggie R. Smith, Separate
Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 21, 28–
29 (1991) (giving similar examples).
130. As mentioned previously, disabled men in female-dominated industries who are victims of sex-disability intersectional discrimination will encounter the same problem. Here, I have focused on the example of disabled
women, however, since sex-disability intersectional discrimination affects
more women than men (as there are many more male-dominated industries
than female-dominated industries).
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bled, gender-minority workers may be more complex. The case
of African-American female workers asks courts to evaluate a
discrimination claim multi-dimensionally within the same
statute, Title VII; the case of disabled, gender-minority workers
asks courts to evaluate a discrimination claim multidimensionally across two statutes, Title VII and the ADA. And
even though prior within-statute intersectional claims have not
131
fared particularly well in courts, prior across-statute claims
132
have historically fared even worse. With these issues in mind,
the next two Sections consider the viability of two potential
remedies for sex-disability intersectional plaintiffs.
A. AMENDING CURRENT STATUTES
Even though sex-disability discrimination involves acrossstatute intersectional discrimination, previous work on withinstatute intersectional discrimination may still serve as a suitable point of departure. Frustrated with federal courts’ typical
proclivity towards considering race and sex discrimination separately (instead of simultaneously), scholars working on with131. See, e.g., DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp.
142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (“[T]his lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a
cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both . . . .”); see also Cathy Scarborough, Note,
Conceptualizing Black Women’s Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457,
1468 (1989) (criticizing cases like DeGraffenreid since “[c]ourts have never divided white women into whites and women, or Black men into Blacks and
men. Their claims have not been treated as divided because the term ‘Blacks’
has been understood to mean Black men, and ‘women’ to mean white women”).
132. Most of the prior scholarship on across-statute intersectional claims
has focused on the intersection of age and sex discrimination, and it has been
even more pessimistic with regards to plaintiffs’ prospects than the present
Article. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 88–89 (2003) (“Of the
courts that have had the opportunity to address the issue, they have either
declined the invitation to decide the issue, or have recognized the cause of action with little or no discussion.”). Although one federal district court has allowed one intersectional sex-age claim to proceed under Title VII and the
ADEA, see Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1241–42 (E.D. Pa. 1994), federal courts of appeals have required the sex discrimination and age discrimination claims to proceed separately since they derive from two different statutes.
See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir.
2004) (en banc) (refusing to recognize an intersectional claim under federal
law brought by a former employee who had allegedly been called a “useless old
lady” by her supervisors); Sherman v. Am. Cyanmid Co., No. 98-4035, 1999
WL 701911, at *5 (6th Cir. 1999) (refusing to recognize sex-age intersectional
claims under federal law). But see Lewis v. CNA Nat. Warranty Corp., 63 F.
Supp. 3d 959, 962–64 (D. Minn. 2014) (allowing a sex-plus-age claim to proceed under Minnesota law, not federal law).
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in-statute, intersectional discrimination against AfricanAmerican women have proposed amendments to current em133
ployment discrimination laws. These amendments would require courts to evaluate hybrid evidence of multiple types of
simultaneous discrimination—that is, to allow explicit intersectional claims—by adding language such as “or any combination
thereof” after Title VII’s explicit prohibitions against race, col134
or, national origin, sex, and religious discrimination. This solution may sound simple in theory, but a closer examination
reveals both its impracticality and its limitations.
First, and practically speaking, the chances of an amendment that expands civil rights protections passing both houses
of Congress seem slight to nonexistent, especially given the
135
current political climate. True, Congress came together in
2008 to pass the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act (ADAAA), which expanded the definition of disability under
the original ADA by explicitly overturning four U.S. Supreme
136
Court cases, and thus expanded preexisting civil rights. But
133. See Areheart, supra note 39, at 234; Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral,
Comment, Women of Color and Employment Discrimination: Race and Gender
Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159, 173 (1993); Virginia W.
Wei, Note, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using
Intersectionality Theory To Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender, and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV. 771, 811 (1996).
134. Areheart, supra note 39; Castro & Corral, supra note 133, at 172.
135. For news articles discussing the recent inability of Congress to pass
major legislation on important issues, including issues on which both Democrats and Republicans agree, see James Fallows, The Tragedy of the American
Military, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516 (describing the
2013–2014 Congressional term as “unusually short and historically unproductive”); Ed Hornick, Why Can’t Congress Just Get Along?, CNN (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/10/11/congress.problems (describing Congress’s inability to get legislation passed as “pathetic but not unexpected. This
is really what we’ve come to expect from this divided Congress”); Carl Hulse,
No Room for Compromise and, Again, No Room for Action, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2016, at A12 (blaming Congress’s ability to pass a gun bill, despite agreement on some points between both parties, on “partisanship, a reluctance to
compromise and the influence of powerful special interests”); see also Ed
O’Keefe, ENDA, Explained, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/11/04/what-is-the-employment-non
-discrimination-act-enda (documenting proponents’ long, unsuccessful struggle
to pass another civil rights bill, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, to
protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender employees from discrimination).
136. See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act § 2(a), Pub. L.
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“[T]he holdings of the Supreme Court in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases
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those particular amendments to the ADA arose in a very different context than would the intersectionality amendments proposed by prior scholars. The ADAAA was a direct reaction to
the tremendous amount of litigation regarding the definition of
disability, which Congress had failed to define fully in the orig137
inal version of the ADA, and the restrictive judicial decisions
that had rendered the act inapplicable to many individuals in
138
need of its protections. Moreover, the ADAAA was passed in
the context of empirical evidence that the original Act had actually harmed the labor market prospects of the intended pro139
tected class, disabled individuals. In contrast, intersectional
scholarship, including the present Article, has presented evidence that federal discrimination statutes have not helped the
labor market prospects of individuals who are members of mul140
tiple protected classes.
Second, the legislative history of Title VII at least points to
an argument that courts should already be considering intersectional discrimination claims, even without an amendment to
the statutory language. During the floor debate on Title VII,
Representative John Dowdy introduced an amendment to add
141
the word “solely” prior to the then-bill’s prohibitions on discrimination “because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
142
sex, or national origin.” But the amendment to Title VII was
have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the
ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect; . . . the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed
the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA.”).
137. See Shinall, supra note 125, at 2 (“Congress failed to define what the
terms ‘impairment,’ ‘substantially limits,’ ‘major life activities,’ and ‘regarded
as’ precisely meant. Nor did Congress provide any rules of construction for the
undefined terms in the ADA. As a result, years of litigation ensued over the
meaning of these terms and, more broadly, over who was disabled for the purposes of the ADA.”).
138. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471 (1999).
139. For well-known empirical work finding a decline in labor market outcomes after the passage of the 1990 version of the ADA, see Acemoglu &
Angrist, supra note 15; DeLeire, supra note 56.
140. See, e.g., Best et al., supra note 37, at 995 (suggesting that Title VII is
not as beneficial to non-white women as it is to white women, but not arguing
that non-white women are worse off under Title VII than they were in the absence of the statute).
141. 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(a)(1) (2012).
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rejected, creating a colorable argument that Congress, in its act
of rejecting the amendment, intended Title VII to encompass
multidimensional discrimination claims. Furthermore, the
qualifier “solely” does not appear (nor has it ever appeared) in
any subsequent employment discrimination statute like the
143
144
ADA or ADEA. This observation, by extension, raises an
argument that multidimensional claims may be cognizable under all employment discrimination statutes, not just Title VII.
Third, an amendment that adds the phrase, “or any combination thereof,” to current federal discrimination statutes may
actually be harmful for victims of across-statute interdisciplinary discrimination. If the phrase were added to Title VII, for
instance, it would strongly nudge courts in the direction of considering multidimensional discrimination claims, as long as
those claims were on the dimension of Title VII. For instance,
such language would strongly endorse the cognoscibility of
race-sex claims, religion-national origin claims, and race-color
145
claims. But such language would also arguably exclude the
possibility of multidimensional discrimination claims that go
beyond the scope of Title VII—including the type of multidimensional discrimination claim at issue here, sex-disability
claims. For all these reasons, amending federal employment
discrimination statutes is neither a realistic nor a satisfying solution to the problems faced by workers who are both disabled
and a gender minority within their industry. Instead, the more
practical solution is to work within the confines of current interpretations of Title VII and the ADA to address intersectional
sex-disability discrimination, which is the subject of the next
Section.
B. WORKING WITH CURRENT STATUTES
Perhaps the most obvious way for intersectional sexdisability plaintiffs to proceed is through the existing sex-plus
framework under Title VII. The sex-plus theory of liability under Title VII alleges that the employer treats a certain characteristic better in one sex than the employer treats the same
characteristic in the opposite sex. Recognition of this theory of
143. See id. §§ 12101–12213.
144. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
145. See Areheart, supra note 39, at 234 (“This solution would expressly
allow cases that allege discrimination based upon more than one category to
proceed without forcing the plaintiff to choose among the distinct categories
explicit in the statute.”).
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Title VII liability traces its origins to the 1971 Supreme Court
146
decision, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. In Phillips, the
employer-defendant, Martin Marietta, had a policy against hiring women with preschool-aged children, but not men with preschool-aged children. The plaintiff, Ida Phillips, had preschoolaged children and had applied, but had been rejected, for a position in which approximately three-quarters of all applicants
147
hired were women. Thus, Phillips would have had a difficult
time bringing a traditional disparate treatment or disparate
impact case under Title VII, since Martin Marietta was obviously willing to hire women (just not women with preschoolaged children). Phillips, as a result, brought the case under the
theory that by treating women with preschool-aged children
differently than men with preschool-aged children, Martin
148
Marietta was discriminating on the basis of sex. The Supreme Court agreed and endorsed the sex-plus theory of liabil149
ity, at least with respect to the right to have children.
Extending the logic of Phillips, a sex-plus-disability case
would take the same sex-plus theory and allege that an employer who treats disabled workers of one sex less favorably
than disabled workers of the other sex violates Title VII. Indeed, broadening the theory from sex-plus-reproduction to sexplus-disability is relatively straightforward under the line of
cases extending from Phillips. Courts have taken Phillips to
stand for the proposition that employers who treat one sex differently than the other sex on the basis of any fundamental
150
Moreover,
right, not just reproduction, violate Title VII.
courts have extended the theory to include discrimination be151
tween the sexes on the basis of any immutable characteristic.
Disability, of course, may be mutable for some individuals af146. 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
147. See id. at 543.
148. See id. at 544.
149. See id.
150. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir.
1975) (“Equal employment opportunity may be secured only when employers
are barred from discriminating against employees on the basis of immutable
characteristics, such as race and national origin. Similarly, an employer cannot have one hiring policy for men and another for women if the distinction is
based on some fundamental right.”).
151. See id.; Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that sex-plus liability under Title VII “allows plaintiffs to bring a Title VII
claim for sex discrimination if they can demonstrate that the defendant discriminated against a subclass of women (or men) based on either (1) an immutable characteristic or (2) the exercise of a fundamental right”).

2017]

THE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED SEX

1151

fected by nonpermanent conditions (e.g., pregnancy-related
152
disability), but for the most part, courts have traditionally
153
Conseconsidered disability an immutable characteristic.
quently, the sex-plus-disability theory of liability should provide an available remedy for individuals who endure intersectional sex-disability discrimination in the workplace.
Yet a brief search for prior sex-plus-disability cases
154
brought in federal court turns up only a handful of cases, in
spite of the fact that the EEOC charge data presented in Part
II indicates that sex-disability intersectional discrimination is
not an uncommon occurrence. This observation raises questions
about why sex-plus-disability is a theory of liability virtually
unheard of in federal court. Several forces may be at work to
limit the number of sex-plus-disability claims on the federal
court dockets. On one hand, the sex-plus-disability theory may
be too conceptually limited to cover all sex-disability intersectional claims. As one scholar has commented, the sex-plus theory “does not involve discrimination based on something in addi152. Note, however, that a great deal of early ADA litigation centered on
the issue of whether a nonpermanent condition could ever be a disability for
the purposes of the ADA, but the 2008 ADA Amendments largely resolved this
debate in the affirmative. See Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325,
333 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Under the ADAAA and its implementing regulations, an
impairment is not categorically excluded from being a disability simply because it is temporary.”).
153. See Clarke, supra note 52, at 41 (recognizing that even though courts
have traditionally considered disability an immutable characteristic, “[m]any
forms of disability, too, might fall through the cracks of the revised immutability, as conditions subject to control and yet seldom celebrated as features of
identity”); see also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Norris, J., concurring) (“It is clear that by ‘immutability’ the [Supreme] Court
has never meant strict immutability in the sense that members of the class
must be physically unable to change or mask the trait defining their class.
People can have operations to change their sex. Aliens can ordinarily become
naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate children can be changed. People
can frequently hide their national origin by changing their customs, their
names, or their associations. . . . At a minimum, then, the Supreme Court is
willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if changing it would involve
great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a traumatic
change of identity.”).
154. An advanced Westlaw search for federal cases using the terms “sex
plus” and “disability” brings up only three prior cases in which the sex-plusdisability theory was advanced by the plaintiff. See Martinez v. NBC, Inc., 49
F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Cardenas-Meade v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 3:09CV-268, 2011 WL 6026893, at *9–10 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2011), aff ’d, 510 F.
App’x 367 (6th Cir. 2013); Preston v. Bristol Hosp., No. 3:12-CV-1252 RNC,
2015 WL 1456764, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2015). In all three cases, the plaintiff was ultimately unsuccessful in proving sex-plus-disability discrimination.
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tion to sex”; the theory instead prohibits employer practices
that are, first and foremost, based on sex, but only apply to a
155
subset of that sex.” Along these lines, it is important to recognize that a sex-plus-disability claim is, at bottom, a sex discrimination claim. A successful plaintiff under this theory
156
would be entitled to a remedy under Title VII, not the ADA.
This statutory distinction may be important for disabled individuals who, at the time of filing a charge, believe that the
principal basis for discrimination is their disability (and as a
result, only file an ADA charge). If such individuals realize only
later during the investigation or discovery processes that sex
also played a role in their adverse employment action, they are
nonetheless barred from pursuing a sex-plus theory, as they
will have failed to exhaust their Title VII administrative reme157
dies.
On the other hand, an even more likely explanation for the
scarcity of sex-plus-disability claims is the difficulty of proof. A
sex-plus claim, by its very nature, requires a plaintiff to prove
that an employer treats members of one sex with a certain immutable characteristic or fundamental right differently than
members of the other sex with that same immutable character158
istic or fundamental right. In the case of disability, presenting such proof might be exceptionally difficult, as it would re155. Shoben, supra note 29, at 804.
156. See id. at 802 (“Another argument supporting the view that Title VII
prohibits intentional discrimination against compound groups relies on the
principles of ‘sex-plus’ discrimination. Sex-plus discrimination occurs when a
hiring practice, while not explicitly directed at a particular sex, operates to exclude only one sex.”). A plaintiff who, instead, tried to bring a disability-plussex claim under the ADA (a claim that an employer treats each sex differently
among disabled workers) would face even more difficulty given that courts
have not recognized the existence of plus claims under any other discrimination statute besides Title VII. See, e.g., Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864,
875 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff ’d, 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Although I recognized a ‘sex-plus-age’ discrimination claim under Title VII in Arnett, I specifically stated: ‘It is important to remember that . . . Arnett’s complaint contains
a claim for sex discrimination, not age discrimination.’ I find no authority to
recognize an ‘age-plus-disability’ discrimination claim under the ADEA. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to protection as a member of a subclass of older
workers with disabilities.” (citation omitted)); Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240 (allowing a sex-plus-age discrimination case to proceed under Title VII, but not
an age-plus-sex case).
157. See supra note 16.
158. See, e.g., Scarborough, supra note 131, at 1472 (noting that the sexplus-race theory of liability “requires that the court ask only ‘if the employer’s
rule singled out only women among Black persons. The answer might be yes,
but then only a sex discrimination claim has been established’”).
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quire a showing that the employer treats disabled workers of
one sex differently than disabled members of the other sex. In
the absence of any smoking-gun statements from the employer,
proving comparative disadvantage in an employment discrimination case is most commonly done via a similarly situated
comparator—in this instance, providing evidence of another
employee who is similarly situated to the plaintiff in all re159
spects except sex. But finding such a comparator would require sex-plus-disability plaintiffs to identify a fellow employee
of the opposite sex who has both the same (or highly similar)
job title and is similarly disabled, but who has been treated
160
more favorably by the employer. Clearly, finding such a comparator would prove quite difficult for most sex-plus-disability
plaintiffs, as it requires plaintiffs to have both a non-unique job
161
title and at least one similarly disabled coworker of the oppo-

159. See Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex
Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1491 (2009) (“The most common method is
to show that similarly situated employees of a different race or sex received
more favorable treatment.”). Some federal circuits require similarly situated
comparator evidence in order to prove an employment discrimination case in
the absence of direct evidence; others strongly prefer such evidence. For a discussion of the problems created by federal courts’ insistence on a similarly situated comparator, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison,
120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011).
160. See generally Goldberg, supra note 159 (engaging in a discussion
about the problems created by the judiciary’s dependence on comparators);
Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in
Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831 (2002) (analyzing the
complications in courts’ analyses of the comparator concept); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60
ALA. L. REV. 191 (2009) (arguing for a more objective standard of comparability).
161. Here and henceforth, I refer to a worker finding a coworker to serve as
a similarly situated comparator for simplicity. Finding such a comparator
would be appropriate outside the hiring context; in the hiring context, the appropriate comparator would be a fellow applicant. As a practical matter, identifying potential comparators from an applicant pool is even more challenging
since individuals typically know very little about whom they are competing
against for a job, and firms often do not keep good, discoverable records of
their applicants (or at least, records as good as the ones they keep for their
employees). The unavailability of firm applicant flow data can prove an insurmountable barrier for many plaintiffs trying to prove hiring discrimination.
For a recent discussion of plaintiff proof barriers in the absence of applicant
flow data (in the context of criminal background check disparate impact cases), see Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM.
L. & POL’Y 2, 7, 16 (2012).
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162

site sex. Indeed, finding a comparator would almost certainly
163
be impossible outside of a large employer.
The proof problems that arise from identifying (or, more
accurately, the inability to identify) a similarly situated comparator are not unique to sex-plus-disability plaintiffs, or even
sex-plus plaintiffs more generally. The problems may be more
acute for sex-plus plaintiffs, who, due to the underlying nature
164
of their claim, have a narrower pool of potential comparators.
Still, these problems arise for nearly all Title VII, ADA, and
ADEA plaintiffs who lack direct, non-circumstantial evidence of
165
employer discrimination. For this reason, outcries for reform
of the current proof structures in employment discrimination
166
167
cases abound from scholars and even federal judges. Moreover, federal courts clearly have the ability to reform current
employment discrimination proof structures since the relevant
federal statutes do not contain any language regarding method

162. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability? Evaluating the
Legal Framework for Protecting Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 101, 139 (2016) (“The use of comparators to prove discrimination can be
problematic, particularly for employees of small companies (since few other
employees can serve as potential comparators) and employees with unique job
titles (since arguably no other employee is similarly situated).”).
163. See id.
164. Cf. Kotkin, supra note 159, at 1491–92 (discussing the difficulty of
finding a similarly situated comparator in Title VII cases and noting that “[i]n
the typical ‘reduction in force’ situation, as long as one woman or one minority
group members survives the RIF, it will be difficult to rely on comparator evidence alone”).
165. Goldberg, supra note 159, at 731–32, 738 (noting that “in a mobile,
knowledge-based economy, actual comparators are hard to come by, even for
run-of-the-mill discrimination claims” and arguing that courts’ continued preferences for comparator evidence “has put comparators in a position to shape
and limit what courts can see as discriminatory”).
166. See id. at 728 (arguing that comparators must be “dislodged from their
methodological pedestal” in order to “recover space for the renewed development of discrimination jurisprudence and theory”); Lidge, supra note 160, at
833 (“[C]ourts should not require a similarly situated showing as an element
of plaintiff ’s prima facie [discrimination] case.”); Sullivan, supra note 160, at
197 (“[S]uggesting a more commonsensical approach to discrimination
claims—one that reframes proof in terms of the underlying substantive law
rather than focusing on special evidentiary rules or proof structures.”).
167. See, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012)
(Wood, J., concurring) (“I write separately to call attention to the snarls and
knots that the current methodologies used in discrimination cases of all kinds
have inflicted on courts and litigants alike. The original McDonnell Douglas
decision was designed to clarify and simplify the plaintiff ’s task in presenting
such a case. Over the years, unfortunately, both of those goals have gone by
the wayside.”).
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168

of proof, and the current proof structures are entirely the cre169
ation of the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
In thinking about how to reform employment discrimination proof structures in a manner friendlier to sex-plusdisability plaintiffs, and intersectional plaintiffs more generally,
at least one scholar has contemplated a manner through which

168. Title VII only dictates burden of proof in disparate impact cases, as a
result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). Title
VII says nothing about indirect or direct methods of proof or similarly situated
comparators in the text of the statute. See id. §§ 2000e-2–2000e-17. Nor does
the ADA and ADEA contain any text about proof structures or similarly situated comparators. See id. §§ 12101–12213; 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
169. The indirect method of proof—through which plaintiffs prove employment discrimination in the absence of increasingly less common “smoking gun”
statements from the employer—was first outlined by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In this landmark
case, the Court outlined a three-stage burden-shifting process for proving an
employment discrimination case indirectly: employee proves a prima facie case
of discrimination, employer produces a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the alleged adverse employment action, and employee proves that the employer’s reason is merely pretext. Id. at 802–06. Evidence of a similarly situated comparator who was treated better than the plaintiff may be relevant at
both the prima facie case stage and the pretext stages, depending on the federal circuit court. See Sullivan, supra note 160, at 194 (“[S]ometimes the presence or absence of a comparator is assessed by the court in determining
whether plaintiff has made out her prima facie case; in other instances, it
arises in deciding if the plaintiff can establish pretext.”). None of the threepart McDonnell Douglas test is grounded in the statutory text of Title VII or
any other employment discrimination statute. See McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802–06. Although the Court’s three-stage process was intended “to
clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action challenging employment discrimination,” the process has arguably generated more confusion
than clarity. Id. at 798; accord Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step,
Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 703, 744–60 (1995); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1188–90 (2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1241 (1995); Deborah
C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229, 2236–38 (1995); see also Coleman, 667 F.3d at 863 (Wood, J., concurring) (“Perhaps McDonnell Douglas was necessary nearly 40 years ago,
when Title VII litigation was still relatively new in the federal courts. By now,
however, . . . the various tests that we insist lawyers use have lost their utility. Courts manage tort litigation every day without the ins and outs of these
methods of proof, and I see no reason why employment discrimination litigation . . . could not be handled in the same straightforward way.”).
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courts might expand the permissible methods of proof to
demonstrate discrimination indirectly:
In order to have a fighting chance in a complex claim, it seems obvious that the evidentiary net must be cast wide. In fact, the more specific the complex claim, the wider the net must be to prove pretext. . . . To determine whether there was complex discrimination at
work, the pool of possible comparators would have had to be expanded, as would the database from which statistical evidence could have
been gathered. “Me too” evidence would have had to been sought up
the chain of supervisory command. There is nothing in discrimination
law doctrine that necessarily prevents some expansion of the eviden170
tiary pool in this manner.

As suggested above, few sex-plus-disability discrimination
plaintiffs will ever be able to succeed if not allowed to present
additional circumstantial evidence in the courtroom besides a
similarly situated comparator. This additional evidence might
include employer practices with respect to coworkers in nonsimilar jobs to the plaintiff, coworkers with non-similar disabilities to the plaintiff, and even non-disabled coworkers. Statistics regarding the overall hiring and promotion practices of the
employer with regards to members of the minority sex and disabled individuals might also be useful, even if these statistics
include some jobs that are dissimilar to the plaintiff ’s job. Together, an abundance of this type of evidence, while not enough
to sustain a case on its own, might be enough to form the “con171
vincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence necessary for the
plaintiff to win the case.
What is certain is that victims of sex-plus-disability discrimination will remain largely marginalized and without a
complete remedy in the absence of employment discrimination
proof reforms. This Article is not unique in its call for such reforms. This Article is unique, however, in its identification of a
previously ignored yet substantial group of discrimination victims who remain disenfranchised by the current system of resolving employment discrimination claims. For these victims,
proving an employment discrimination case under current
proof structures is even more difficult than it is for the groups

170. Kotkin, supra note 159, at 1497–98.
171. This phrase, first coined by Judge Posner in the well-known opinion
Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994), is now frequently used by federal judges, particularly in the Seventh Circuit, to signify
the amount of circumstantial evidence necessary to prove an employment discrimination case successfully. See, e.g., Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d
635, 637 (7th Cir. 2013); Coleman, 667 F.3d at 835.
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172

of victims highlighted by previous scholars. The issues raised
by intersectionality under the current system of adjudicating
employment discrimination claims are relevant to more than
African-American women. As this Article has demonstrated,
they are relevant to the non-negligible group of disabled workers who are also a gender minority within their industry. Undoubtedly, they are also relevant to other groups of workers
who are members of two or more protected classes and, as a result, fall victim to intersectional discrimination. Without proof
reforms, these workers who, in name, are protected by multiple
employment discrimination provisions, but in fact, cannot access these provisions, will continue to be victimized. And without an accessible legal remedy, these workers will remain substantially impaired in the labor market.

172. Indeed, as difficult as it would be for an African-American female
plaintiff to find a similarly situated comparator (who would need to be an African-American male with a highly similar job) in order to prove a sex-plus-race
case circumstantially, the difficulty pales in comparison to the hurdle faced by
sex-plus-disability plaintiffs (who would need to find a similarly disabled comparator of the opposite sex in a highly similar job). Cf. Goldberg, supra note
159, at 736 (“[A]n employee, such as a black woman or a disabled older man,
claims to have experienced discrimination based on a combination of legally
protected traits. He or she struggles under a comparator regime in part because it can be difficult to decide who is the proper comparator.”).

